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Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the course of the 1980s, Ireland has achieved a re-
markable macroeconomic adjustment. Having entered
the decade with high infletion, a substantial external
deficit and deterioreting public finances, the economy
has been restored to conditions of nominal stability.
Inflation is now among the lowest in the Community, the
external account is in surplus and budgetary stabilisation
has been attained. Underlying the adjustment has been
the emergence of a progressively more coherent macro-
economic policy regime. Exchange rate discipline im-
posed by membership of the ERM helped to ensure I
disinflation of the economy in the first half of the 1980s;
a successful fiscal consolidation completed the nominal
convergence process towards the end of the decade.
The scale of budgetary adjustment achieved in the past
four years has been particularly impressive and has fo-
cused international attention on the lrish experience.
The fiscal consolidation process can be traced back to
1981 but the degree of adjusiment up to 1986 was inade-
quate to achieve budgetary stabilisation in unfavourable
economic conditions. The positive expectations effects
of a more credible macroeconomic policy framework
adopted after 1987, coupled with an improvement in the
external economic environment, laid the basis for the
more successful stabilisation effort in the second half of
the decade. Net borrowing by general government has
been reduced by almost 8% of GDP and a steep upward
trajectory in the public debt/GDP ratio has been
reversed. While the sustainability of budgetary policy
has been restored, fiscal consolidation remains the cen-
trepiece of medium-term economic policy.
As the effects of nominal adjustment fed into the real
economy, activity was weak and a severe problem of
structural unemployment emerged. Since 1981, the un-
employment rate has almost doubled and is now the
highest in the Community. The structural nature of Irish
unemployment reflects a combination of demographic
pressure and the emergence of significant duality in the
economy. The rate of nrtural increase in the labour force
is very high by Community standards and the concentra-
tion of production in foreign-based capital-intensive
manufacturing sectors has tended to exacerbate the
shortfall in labour demand relative to supply. The emer-
gence of the robust foreign sector coincided with the
"weeding out" of the traditional sectors in the disinfla-
tion period, resulting in an important structural shift in
the economy. Many of lreland's growing number of
long-term unemployed belong to this traditional cohort
of the manufacturing labour force. S/hile employment
has recovered stronlly in recent years, the improvement
has been insufficient to ensure a reduction in unepploy-
ment in the absence of high rates of emigration. As
emigration flows have virtually stopped in responso to
tecession in the IJK and US economies, Ireland's unem-
ployment rate has again begun to climb.
The counterpart of heland's nominal adjustment in the
1980s was aperiod of limited progress in the catching-up
process. The rapid catching up achieved through fiscal
activism in the late 1970s was the source of the major
nominal disequilibria in the early 1980s; catching up
was almost completely stalled in the subseguent period
of adjustment. More recentln the coincidence of im-
proved intemal conditions and the expansion of world
trade has facilitated a resumption of an accelerated
catching-up process. By 1990, per capita GDP in Ireland
relative to the Communiqr average had risen to a high
point of 68,6%; however, the weakness of economic
performance in 1991 implies little further improvement
in the short term.
If an accelerated and balanced catching up in the Irish
economy is to be sustained, macroeconomic stabilisation
must now be followed by a programme of radical struc-
tural reform. Such reform will ensure that national econ-
omic policy focuses on the microeconomic measures
necessary to improve the productive efficiency of the
economy as well as reconciling the pattern of output
growth to the factor endowments of the economy. Some
improvement will already have been achieved by recent
supply-side measures at the national level and increesed
assistance in the development of physical and human
infrastructure through the Community Support Frame-
work 1989-93. However, further reform to ensure a
more balanced treatment of labour and capital in econ-
omic policy needs to be considered, particularly in thc
fields of industrial strategy, taxation and labour markct
policies.
In the context of Economic and Monetary Union, the
small and open hish economy faces both opportunities
and challenges. It is imporiant, therefore, that the capao-
ity of the economy to adapt flexibly to changcs in its
external environment be enhanced. In eddition to
necessary structural reform, the continued fregility of
the public finances must be addressed. While budgetary
stabilisation has been achieved, the enormous overhang
of public debt remains an important constreint on mec-
roeconomic performance and will werken the cepecity
ExccttivcSunmery
of the cconomy to bGncfit fully from furthcr Community
intcgrrtion. A continucd rcduction in thc public
dcbVGDPratio is erscntirl; this will also hclp to narrow
intcrcst nto diffcrentidc further rnd to reducc currently
high rcal intcrcst retcs.
The reccnt succcss in hcland's catching-up performancc
suSgcats that thc dircction of hcland's macroeconomic
policy framework is broadly appropriate. To the cxtent
thrt greater integretion rcinforces this policy framework
rnd promotcs the domcstic conditions for growth, the
Irish cconomy crn crpcct to pcrform wcll in BMU. This
benign view of thc ryncrgy botwccn EMU rcquircmartr
and hcland's crtching-up pcrformrnco ir not without
qucstion; disrdvutegcr in tcrmr of ccelo and tcchno-
logicel cndowmcnt hevc becn citod ls posriblc impodi-
mcnts to lreland's success within cconomic union.
Srhilc certein sqcton in thc cconomy will undoubtcdly
be thrcetcncd by gertGr intcgrrtion, therc is cvidcnco to
suggest thet othcr scctorc will tbrivc. Monctary union
per se is lcss likely to posc seriour problcms for thc Irish
economy, provided nominal st$ility is meintrined.
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Part I
IRELAND : MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND
STRUCTURAL REFORM
0. Introduction
By the second half of the 1980s, after several years of
very weak growth and rising unemployment, disinflation
had been achieved in Ireland and a previously massive
current account deficit had been significantly reduced.
On the other hand, Iittle progress had been made in
rectifying the serious budgetary imbalances and doubts
still remained about the possibility of returning to strong
and durable growth of activity and employment. Since
then, stabilization has been reinforced; significant pro-
gress has been made on fiscal consolidation; output and
employment have risen more strongly, enabling a re-
sumption of the real convergence process.
These achievements, made possible by the authorities'
continued commitment to stability-oriented policies and
by the favourable environment, are reviewed in this
paper. The paper also stresses the improvements that are
necessary and the conditions to be met for lreland to
enjoy success in the approach to EMU. In that respect,
increases in potential output and employment and reduc-
tion in the curently very high level of unemployment
are the main objectives. Reforms in industrial policy,
the labour market and the taxation system as well as
further financial deregulation will need to be considered.
Nominal stability should continue to be the priority for
the macroeconomic policy-mix. The level of the public
debt is still an important constraint on economic policn
raising questions about the appropriate targets for the
budget deficit. The structure of the balance of payments
may suggest a need for higher investment and implies
scope for further structural improvement. Meanwhile,
monetary policy - in effect the pursuit of exchange-rate
policy - has been successful in combining inflation con-
vergence with the maintenance of relatively strong
growth.
1. Convergence of the lrish economy with the
rest of the Community
Substantial nominal convergence achieved in
the 1980s...
Nominal conditions in the lrish economy had seriously
deteriorated by the beginning of the 1980s. Inflation was
approaching 2O?o, the current deficit on the balance of
payments was close to 15% of GDP and net borrowing
by government w8s about 13% of GDP. The source of
these disequilibria lay in the second oil-price shock and
the markedly procyclical fiscal and monetary policies
which had operated since the mid-1970s. Efforts to re-
store nominal stability in the economy began to take
effect after 1981 when the real effective exchange rate
appreciated under the ERM constraint and demand in the
economy was restrained by the perceived need for, and
attempts to achieve, budgetary consolidation. As a re-
sult, dlslnftatlon was practically completed by 1985,
helped by the weakness in oil and commodity prices on
international markets. Inflation fell to about 2?o in L987
while a small surplus emerged on the current account of
the balance of payments.
Inflation and Current Account Convergence
Greph 1: Current tccouna rdfustment l9tl .1991
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...but at o cost of limited progress in real
convergence...
As growth in the economy was constrained by the disin-
flation process and the effects of fiscal consolidation
efforts, Ireland's catching-up process stalled. Between
1981 and 1986, per capita GDP did not improve relative
to the Community average, while the corresponding
trend in per capita GNP was downward. Economic de-
velopment was characterised by a sharp decline in the
investment/GDP ratio as unfavourable conditions cur-
tailed private sector activity and public capital expendi-
ture was consolidated. Moreover, as the labour-intensive
traditional sectors of the economy were squeezed by real
appreciation of the hish pound, I high level of structural
unemployment emerged.
...and an increasingly worrying debt spiral...
With economic growth well below trend, the automatic
stabilisers in operation and real interest rates rising,
conditions in the public finances became dynamically
unstable despite determined efforts at consolidation.
Thus by 1986, net borrowing by general government
remained about 1l% of GDP and the public debt/GDP
ratio had risen to 116,5?o of GDP.
So, convergence remained fragile...
By August 1986, the weakness of the economy and, in
particular, losses of Irish competitiveness vis-l-vis ster-
ling prompted a unilateral realignment within the ERM.
As the public debt problem appeared increasingly in-
tractable and a continued slide in sterling posed a risk of
further devatuation, the economy experienced very sub-
stantial capital flight. Despite the current account im-
provement, the overall balance of payments moved into
substantial deficit, with a massively negative unidenti-
fied residual (about 8% of GDP). Capital outflows led
to a fall in the money supply during the course of 1986
and to extremely high interest-rate differentials.
...until policy became more credible.
1987 marked a major shift in expectations. A new politi-
cal and social consensus' radically improved the credi-
bility of budgetary consolidation and the external
environment became much more favourable. As credi-
bility in the new policy regime was established, expec-
tations in the economy turned positive and the earlier
substantial achievements in nominal convergence facili-
tated a sharp exportJed recovery in the real economy.
Exchange rate stability has maintained a low inflation
rate and together with the budgetary stabilisation has
reduced the risk premium on domestic interest rates to
historically low levels. Low inflation has moderated
wage growth, while there appears to have been an excep-
tionally strong productivity performance. The resulting
improvement in unit labour costs and lower interest rates
has fostered a recovery in private investment. Between
1987 and 1990, investment volume grew by 25% as the
investment/GDP ratio rose from below l79o to 18.25%
despite a further reduction in public capital expenditure.
The catching up process has now resumed...
Although economic performance has weakened signifi-
cantly in 1991, the ayerage annual growth rate in the
economy between 1987 and 1990 was 4.896, according
to official GDP statistics. This has resulted in a resump-
tion of the catching-up process; per capita GDP has risen
by about 5 points relative to the Community average,
while relative per capita GNP has increased by 3.5
points. Initially, the recovery was exclusively export-
led; export perforrrance benefited from high external
demand and improved competitiveness while import vol-
umes were restrained by weakness in the domestic sec-
tors. However, as investment and private consumption
(supported by disposable income increases) have risen,
internal demand has become the main impetus to econ-
omic growth. In response to higher demand, import
growth has returned to more normal rates but the current
account on the balance of payments remains in surplus.
As the economy has recovered, there has been a lagged
improvement in employment creation. Having virtually
stagnated throughout the first half of the 1980s, employ-
ment growth moved into line with the Community aver-
age of about 1.5% over the two years 1989 and 1990.
This rate remains well below the natural rate of increase
in the labour force (about 2.5%)bfi supply pressure on
the domestic labour market was eased by the re-emer-
gence of high rates of emigration. As growth in the
economy has slowed and recession in the IJK and US has
reduced emigration flows, domestic labour market con-
ditions have again deteriorated. Employment growth has
fallen to a very low level and unemployment has risen to
the highest level in the Community.
Since 1987, there have been two eonomic programmes - the Programme for National Reoovery (PNR) 1987-90 and the
Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP) L99l-93 - agreed between government and social partsrere.
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...without loss of nominal stabitity.
A unique characteristic of heland's more recent catch-
ing-up performance has been the absence of nominal
divergence; the Irish inflation rate is currently below
German levels and the current account remains in sur-
plus. The lrish experience differs from that of other
catching-up countries (i.e. Spain and Portugal) which
have experienced inflationary pressures and external im-
balance as growth in the economy has accelerated. The
Irish phenomenon can be explained by the initial con-
centration ofeconomic recovery in the external sector in
the period 1987-88 while internal demand was con-
strained by the impact of fiscal consolidation; since
mid-1989, high real interestrates have helped to dampen
any inflationary pressures.
During the first part of 1991, slow growth in the econ-
omy has reflected a less favourable external environment
and the delayed impact of high real interest rates. As
growth rates weakenrelative to the Community average,
further significant progress in the catching up process is
unlikely in the short term. Real GDP growth is expected
to average 2Vo per annum in 1991 and 1992, recovering
slowly in the medium term. Maintaining recent progress
in closing the per-capita GDP/GNP gap is likely to be
made even more difficult by an anticipated rise in popu-
lation as emigration slows down in response to the weak-
ness of labour demand in the UK and USA.
2.The budgetary stabilisation post 1987
In contrast to earlier efforts, intensified fiscal
consolidation since 1987 has successfully stsbi-
lised the debt ratio...
By 1986, the economic policy debate in Ireland was
dominated by the severe disequilibria in the public fin-
ances. Sustained efforts at budgetary correction between
1981 and 1986 were inadequate and stabilisation was not
achieved. A sharp reduction of about 45% of GDP in
the primary deficit, mainly through tax increases, had
not been sufficient to offset a *snowballing" in debt-ser-
vicing costs. Total net borrowing by general government
remained stubbornly above ll%o of GDP and the public
debt/GDP ratio spiralled upwards.
Faced with a looming budgetary crisis, the government
intensified the fiscal consolidation effort in a new me-
dium-term fiscal adjustment programme beginning in
1987. This programme was designed to achieve the sta-
bilisation of the public debt/GDP ratio within three years
by means of a phased reduction in government borrow-
ing. The burden of adjustment shifted from taxation to
public expenditure, because the tax burden had risen
substantially in the course of the earlier efforts at budge-
tary correction; further increases in fiscal pressure risked
to be counterproductive.
Although the budgetary adjustment path was not stated,
the programme targets were ambitious both in economic
and political terms. Stabilisation of the debUGDP ratio
as prograrnmed would necessitate a further sharp im-
provement in the primary balance; given the medium-
term economic prospects at the time, a major
consolidation of public expenditure was necessary. In
fact, the programme has proved to be remarkably suc-
cessful and debt stabilisation was realised well ahead of
schedule (about mid-1988). Official budgetary targets
have been consistently "overachieved" to such an extent
that the upward trajectory in the public debt/GDP ratio
has been sharply reversed.
The decline in the debt ratio from a peak of 118.5% of
GDP in 1988 to 99.8Vo in 1990 has coincided with the
emergence of a primary surplus of more than 5% of GDP.
Total net borrowing by government has been reduced by
87o in terms of GDP, comprising an 11 point reduction
in the public expenditure share of GDP and a 3 point
reduction in the tax burden2.Within public expenditure,
the largest single target of adjustment has been social
uses, on which capital expenditure fell by tbolt2?o of.
GDP and current expenditure fell by about 3.5% otGDP.
Interest payments also fell by about 1.59o of GDP. The
trend in the public service wage bill has been restrained
through a combination of limited wage control and ra-
A notable feature of the budgetary adjustment was an official tax amnesty offered in 1988 to all those owing tax anears.
Initially, the amnesty was expected to raise about IRL fi million (0.17o of GDP) in financial 1988 but ultimately raised about
IRL 5fi) million (2.5Vo of GDP).
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tionalisation of the labour force. Tax relief has been
concentrated on labour income where the standard and
higher tax rates have been reduced. Expenditure tax rates
have also been lowered in anticipation of the completion
of the Single Market.
Public borrowing and debt
Greph 4: Net borruvhg eld prluery brlencc
ol 3clcrd govt.
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...helped by a positive expectations effect and
an improved external environment...
The success ofbudgetary adjustment post 1986 sontrasts
very sharply with the failure of efforts in the earlier years
of the decade. The scale of adjustment achieved since
1987 has focused attention on the Irish experience as I
possible model for general application. In this respect,
it is interesting to examine more closely the factors
contributing to the spectacular success of the stabilisa-
tion effort. (See Annex 1 for more detailed consider-
ation.) In particular, the relative importance of
discretionary and nondissretionary elements in the ad-
justment process must be analyzed. An intuitive ap-
proach is to simply contrast the two phases of Ireland's
adjustment -
(i) the first phase from 1981 to 1986, in which a
substantial budgetary consolidation effort took
place but which failed in its stabilisation objective;
and
(ii) the second phase from 1987 onwards, in which
stabilisation has been successfully achieved.
- so as to identify the conditions which determined the
success of the second phase relative to the first.
fhs first phase of budgetary consolidation coincided
with considerable weakness in the domestic economy;
real GDP grew by an average of only L5% per annum.
As a small open economy, Ireland was particularly af-
fected by the slowdown in world trade in the early 1980s.
The external contribution to growth was also constrained
by a real appreciation in the punt as part of the domestic
disinflation process. In line with international trends,
Irish real interest rates turned sharply positive after 1981
further depressing activity in the economy. The budge-
tary adjustment in this phase was to be achieved through
increased taxation so that any associated supply-side
response was likely to be negative. Moreover, as stabili-
sation was delayed the anticipation of a progressively
larger fiscal correction was undermining confidence in
the economy. As the weakness of extemal demand and
rising international real interest rates fed into the domes-
tic economy, conditions for budgetary stabilisation be-
came increasingly unfavourable. The internal dynamic
of the public finances became explosive, as a vicious
circle of accumulating debt, rising debt-servicing costs
(the effective real rate of interest on public debt rose
from -7.27o in 1981 to +39o in 1986) and higher borrow-
ing was set in motion.
In marked contrast, the second phase of budgetary ad-
justment took place at an ideal point in the economic
cycle. External demand was supported by a pronounced
upswing in world trade from 1986 and by a stabilisation
in the real punt exchange rate as disinflation was com-
pleted. As private sector expectations responded positiv-
ely to the greater coherence in the macroeconomic policy
regime, Irish interest rates fell sharply reflccting a nar-
rowing of differentials in response to the new cons€nsus-
based budgetary and exchange rate regime and the
generalised easing in international monetary conditions.
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The focus of budgetary adjustment in this phase was on
expenditure so that r less negative supply-side response
was to be expected. The recovery in the domestic econ-
omy coupled with the favourable external trade environ-
ment and reduced real interest rates, induced a stable
dynamic in the Irish public finances; this dynamic ulti-
mately facilitated the sharp reversal in the trajectory of
the public debt/GDP ratio.
...and also by the earlier stabilisation efforts.
In comparing the discretionary elements of the two
phases of stabilisation, the appropriate measure is the
cyclically-adjusted primary balance. This measure at-
tempts to remove the impacts of growth, interest rates
and exchange rates on the public finance dynamics and
so more accurately reflects policy-induced adjustment.
The trend in keland's cyclically-adjusted primary bal-
ance over the period 1981-90 indicates that the under-
lying stance of fiscal policy in both phases of adjustment
has been restrictive but that, in quantitative terms, the
discretionary tightening of policy in the first phase of
adjustment was probably greater than in the second.
Thus, in assessing the Irish experience of stabitisation it
is important to consider the entire period of adjustment
since 1981 and not simply the more spectacular phase
after 1987. The contrasting response of expectations
reflecting qualitative differences (i.e. political/social
consensus and greater emphasis on expenditure cuts in
the second phase) in thc two phases of adjustment was
of great importance; however, external factors have
clearly played a significant role both in the success of
the post-l987 adjustment and in the failure ofthe earlier
efforts. Moreover, the contribution of the substantial
discretionary adjustment efforts in the first phase,
together with the political/social consensus inspired by
the need for even further efforts after 1987, must be fully
appreciated when assessing the success of the second
phase.
3. Structural constraints on economic
performance
Despite successful budgetary stabilisation, the
public debt overhang remains an important
constraint...
\Yhile the crisis in the public finances may have passed,
the medium-term constraint of t[re enonnous overhang
of public debt remains. Despite a substantial reduction
since 1988, the public debt/GDP ratio remains around
100% with a corresponding interest burden of 8-9% ot
GDP. A priori, it is impossible to determine an optimal
public debt/GDP ratio and the pace of reduction in the
ratio is probably less important than the trajectory itself.
Nevertheless, the sensitivity of the public finance dyna-
mics to a deterioration in the international economic
environment lends support to the argument for an accel-
erated reduction in the public debVGDP ratio. As dis-
cussed later, a fall in the debt burden will reduce the
vulnerability of the public finances to external shocks
and will release resources which might otherwise be
absorbed in financing debt-servicing costs. For these
reasons, fiscal restraint is likely to remain a necessary
element of the Irish macroeconomic policy mix for some
time. Achievement of the official medium-term targets
of reducing the public debt/GNP ratio to 100% (about
909o in terms of GDP) by 1993 and to 757o (about 68%
in terms of GDP) by 2000 might be seen as a minimum
requirement.
...together with high unemployment.
Apart from public finance disequilibria, high unemploy-
ment was the principal feature of the Irish economy in
the 1980s. The unemployment rate peaked * 18.2% in
1988 but declined to about 15.4% n 1990. While em-
ployment has grown over this period, the improvement
in unemployment rates was largely attributable to high
emigration. This is illustrated by the sharp rise in unem-
ployment in the first half of 1991 which has coincided
with the slowdown in emigration due to recession in the
UK and USA.
Much of Ireland's high level of unemployment, com-
pared to earlier years, can be traced to structural adjust-
ments in the economy during the 1980s. A policy of
industrial modernisation has led to the emergence of a
significant duality in manufacturing industry. The
manufacturing base is now divided between highproduc-
tivity, (i.e. capital-intensive) foreign-based sectors and
lower productivity (i.e. labour-intensive) traditional sec-
tors. The emergence of the robust foreign-based sectors
coincided with a substantial "weeding out" of the tradi-
tional sectors in the disinflation period, resulting in an
important structural shift in the economy.
The structural transformation of the manufacturing base
has facilitated a sustained period of accelerated produc-
tivity growth (averaging aboul7.57o per annum over the
period since l98l)r. However, as the modern sectors are
capital-intensive relative to the traditional sectors they
have replaced, an element of the improved productivity
performance has been a significant net'reduction in
manufacturing employment (-30% 1981-87). A signifi-
3 There is much to suggest that these productivity figures are distorted by transfer pncing activities in the foreigr-based sectors
of manufactuing. However, it is very pobable that substantial productivity gains have been made in Irish murufrchring in
the cornse of the 1980s.
Macroeconomic Adjustment and Structural Reform
cant number of lreland's long-term unemployed belong
to this displaced cohort of the manufacturing labour
force.
There is scope for further structural reform to
boost potential output and the employment re-
sponse to growth...
Structural reform is now essential to consolidate the
achievements at the macroeconomic level and will en-
sure that national economic policy focuses on the micro-
economic measures necessary to improve the productive
efficiency of the economy. Such improvements should
also help to reconcile the pattern of output growth to the
factor endowments of the hish economy, providing the
conditions for a sustainable reduction in unemployment.
Some improvement will already have been achieved by
recent supply-side measures at the national level, par-
ticularly in the fields of taxation and financial deregula-
tion. Substantial Community assistance to national
efforts in the areas of physical infrastructure and human
capital to be provided through the Community Support
Framework 1989-93 will also help in this regard. The
CSF for Ireland provides for Community assistance
averaging between 2% and3lo of GDP per annum over
the period 1989-93; the primary focus ofthe operational
programmes underlying the CSF is to enhance kish ex-
port potentisl (particularly in areas of perceived com-
parative advantage), to assist in the development of
human resources and finally to address locational disad-
vantages facing the economy. However, there remains
considerable scope for complementary adjustments to
structural policies at the national level.
...through improvements in industrial policy...
As in all catching-up countries, Ireland's industrial pol-
icy reflects the need to foster capital accumulation and
technical progress within the productive system. In this
wan a sustained improvement in labour productivity can
be achieved moving per capita output closer to the Com-
munity average. Since the late 1970s, Ireland's policy of
industrial modernisation has been based on the attraction
of mobile foreign investment to the economy. This type
of capital accumulation is particularly attractive as it
simultaneously enhances the average efficiency of capi-
tal through high levels of embodied technology.
Inward investment to lreland has risen very substantially
since the mid-1970s and has been concentrated in acti-
vities characterised by vertical integration and transfer
pricing, with substantial profit repatriation (about 87o
net of GDP in 1989) a related feature. In this way, the
value-added accruing to the domestic economy from
inward investment is diluted. The result is a substantial
positive differential between GDP and GNP as the in-
come generated in the foreign-based sectors leaks from
the economy, and "spillover" effects elsewhere in the
economy arereduced. A further consequence oflreland's
policy of industrial modernisation through inward in-
vestment has been the emergence of severe duality in the
economy. The emergence of a dual economic structure
between domestic sectors and the foreign sector reflects
an implicit "targeting" of inward investment within in-
dustrial policy. Mobile capital is attacted to heland by
a generous package of capital grant-aid and fiscal incen-
tives. While there is no evidence of formal discrimina-
tion between foreign and domestic investment, it is
likely that the limited scale of capital investment affor-
dable by most domestic investors, relative to their
foreign-based counterparts, explains the relatively poor
response to industrial incentives from indigenous sour-
ces. In this way, inward investment is effectively fa-
voured over domestic sources within industrial policy.
While the foreign sectors provide a significant share of
employment (about 40% of manufacturing and about 8%
of total), there has been a shortfall in labour demand
from the new manufacturing sectors relative to the la-
bour outflow from the declining sectors. A rising capi-
tal/labour ratio is not surprising in the manufacturing
base of a catching-up economy. However, the rate of
employment creation in the manufacturing sector and the
economy as a whole has not been helped by the bias
towards capital in the treatment of production factors
within industrial and fiscal policy. Meanwhile, as the tax
burden on labour income has risen to sustain public
finance imbalances, relative factor prices have been fur-
ther distorted, depressing employment creation in the
economy as a whole. This distortion of relative prices
will not only have reduced the employment response to
growth (by encouraging capital deepening) but will also
have penalised entrepreneurship and so further dis-
criminated against indigenous investment activity.
Continued success in the existing industrial policy is
likely to result in an increasing weight of foreign relative
to domestic investment in the Irish economy. If linkage
between the two sectors cannot be improved, the dif-
ferential between GDP and GNP will widen further.
Moreover, as capital intensity in the production process
increases but profits continue to leak abroad there is a
risk that the employment response to economic growth
will be progressively eroded. A more neutral treatment
of production factors within industrial/fiscal policy and
further measures to improve linkage between the
foreign-based and indigenous sectors would help to pro-
vide a more balanced development in the economy. In
more recent years, Irish industrial policy has moved in
this direction (with adjustments to the treatment of capi-
tal and payroll taxation and reduced emphasis on grant-
aid to fixed assets) but there is scope for further
improvement.
...reform in the labour market and the taxation
system...
The below-average employment response to output
growth combined with demographic pressures suggests
serious latent supply pressures in the domestic market
Macroeconomic Adjustment and Structural Reform
whenever external (mainly lJK) demand for labour sub-
sides. On the assumption of zero migration and un-
changed participation rates, employment would be
required to expand by 2-2.5?o per annum to restrain
unemployment to its present level. lVhile such growth
rates cannot be realistically expected, there is evidence
that the employment response to growth in the economy
could be improved by labour market reforms. Better
quality training, more targeted social welfare payments
and the encouragement of more flexible working pat-
terns are all important to improve the operation of the
labour market. However, the most obvious requirement
in this respect is to reduce the substantial "t8x wedge"
between the gross and net wage; this wedge acts as a
potential disincentive to both labour demand and supply.
The tax relief offered since 1987 has already narrowed
the tax wedge to some extent. A further substantial re-
duction can only be achieved in the context of a global
reform of the taxation system. Such reform would need
to be largely revenue-neutral and designed to broaden
the tax base while reducing effective rates. The main
targets for increased taxation to compensate for revenue
losses elsewhere would be fixed assets (most notably
residential property on which taxes are very low) and
zero VAT-rated consumer items. In reducing the tax
burden on labour income, the approach adopted by the
authorities in recent years has been to concentrate on
lowering rates. An alternative approach might be to place
greater emphasis on raising the threshold of tax in-
cidence by adjusting bands at unchanged statutory rates.
In this way, tax relief could be provided without loss of
progressivity in the system.
...and reforms in the financial system.
Much progress has already been made in the removal of
exchange controls in lreland; however, certain of the
benefits stemming from liberalisation depend on the
complete elimination of controls. In this context, the
appropriateness ofmaintaining residual controls and de-
laying their removal to 1992 is guestionabte. In line with
capital liberalisation, further improvements in the regu-
latory framework covering the financial sectors may be
required. heland has many Iocational advantages for the
international financial Community. As technology ad-
vances, peripheral locations will become increasingly
attractive relative to more congested centres so long as
adequate support in terms of physical infrastructure and
human resources is available. In this respect, Ireland is
relatively well placed to gain from greater European
financial integration.
Internal financial deregulation should be completed by
phasing out the compulsory investment by banks in gov-
ernment securities. This liquidity ratio, called second-
ary, varies between l37o and 257o of banks' relevant
resources and, although it has no fundamental impact on
banks' competitiveness (being remunerated at market
rates) it diminishes to a large extent the productive role
of the banking system and risks causing misallocation of
resources. In a context where countries compete morc
and more through their supply-side performance, such
distortions may need to be removed.
Similarln the banks'reserve requirements, which still
stand at 87o of their relevant resources, are remunerated
at below market rates; thus they are a burden to the
banking system and can cause dislocation and disinter-
mediation of funds while serving only a limited mon-
etary function.
4. Macroeconomic policies and problems in
the approach to EMU
As emphasized previously, macroeconomic policy in
heland has achieved very considerable success. None-
theless, a number of issues remain su151urding. These
concern the public finance situation (as shaped both by
the debt ratio and the budget deficit), the present very
high level of unemployment, the implications of the
present structure of the balance of payments, the lessons
to be drawn from heland's erperience in the ERM, and
the balance of costs for and benefits to heland likely to
flow from economic and monetary union.
The debt ratio is still a potential risk...
As a result of the high debt ratio, hish economic policy
remains vulnerable to extemal developments. A very
favourable external environment from 1987 to 1990
helped considerably in first stabilizing and thenreducing
the debt ratio from a level at which the prospect of debt
unsustainability in Ireland was being seriously dis-
cussed. A less favourable environment - for instance, a
combination of higher world interest rates and slower
world growth - could create problems. With the d€bt
ratio in Ireland still close to 100?o, any 'accidents' on
interest rates or the growth rate could threaten to recreate
concerns about debt unsustainability.
Precisely such considerations underlie the widely-
agreed emphasis on reducing debt ratios in a number of
Community countries in advance of EMU, in order to
avoid the risk that the markets might anticipate the need
for a "bail out". Discussion on a reference value for thc
debt ratio is not yet concluded but a figure of 60% is
being actively considered as the one above which coun-
tries would be required to reduce their debt ratios.
Ireland would clearly have some way to go to meet such
a figure. The present medium-terrn budgetary targets in
Ireland foresee a reduction of the ratio to 90% of GDP
by 1993 a\d to 68Eo of GDP by 2000. These targets are
challenging; the analysis in Annex I shows that, even if
the relationship between real growth rates and real intcr-
est rates becomes more favourable than it is at present,
a 607o ratio would not be achieved this century without
a significant rise in the primary surplus from its alreedy
very substantial level of around 5% of GDP.
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... and reducing it is becoming more difficult.
What is important is that the downward trajectory of the
debt ratio should be clearly maintained. In the short
term, this may not be easy. Activity in 1991 is turning
out to be weaker than assumed when the budget was
framed, and this year's targeted net borrowing of central
government (1.9% of GDP) is likely to be overshot,
requiring further discretionary adjustments if a desirable
trajectory is to be maintained. Given this prospect, it can
be suggested that more adjustment should have been
aimed at in 1989 and 1990, when growth in the economy
was very strong.
The balance of payments does not indicate par-
ticular dynamism ...
With respect to the balance of payments, the dramatic
improvement in the current account between 1981 and
1986 could be more than accounted for by demand dif-
ferentials, Irish domestic demand being extremely sub-
dued. Since 1987, a continued if much less dramatic
swing taking the current account into surplus, has been
accompanied by much livelier Irish demand growth.
Export market growth (notably in the UK in 1987-89) is
one explanatory factor. However, market shares have
also improved (although perhaps by Iess than might have
been suggested by the strong recorded improvement in
lrish competitiveness resulting from a sharp accelera-
tion, as depicted by official statistics, in productivity).
The improvement in the public finances has been re-
flected in the balance of payments by a fall in total
official borrowing from abroad over the period since the
mid-1980s. However private capital outflows were on a
rising trend in the second half of the 1980s. There was a
peak in 1989 as capital controls were substantially loos-
ened, leading to portfolio reallocations. The counterpart
to this was a very strong inflow of foreign funds into
Irish government bonds, allowing the government to
retire some previous direct borrowings. In 1990, both
private outflows and foreign purchases of Irish govern-
ment bonds fell back. Nonetheless, net private outflows
remain at a very high level. This phenomenon is not
entirely consistent with an accelerated catching-up pro-
cess based upon rapidly rising levels of productivity,
which normally would make keland, like Spain and
Portugal, an attractive location for indigenous invest-
ment. The existence of private capital outflows, accom-
panied by substantial inflows through the banking
s€ctor, may suggest inadeguate investment opportunities
in the indigenous sector.
... and confirms the need for structural change.
In sum, balance of payments developments can be seen
as confirming the need for the structural change; the
consequences of such improvements would be to help
the process ofeconomic development in Ireland pervade
the economy as a whole, stimulating output, employ-
ment and domestic demand. Given that the increase in
unemployment in 1991 will not be quickly reversed, the
need for structural reform is becoming insls$ingly ur-
gent.
Commitment to exchange rate was subject to
early pressures...
In lreland, as in several other Community countries,
exchange-rate discipline has been the fundamental tool
first for achieving disinflation and then for maintaining
a high degree of price stability. Ireland's early years in
the ERM were heavily influenced by fluctuations in
sterling and by excesses in Irish budgetary policy; the
Irish pound participated in a number of realignments,
including the unilateral realignment of August 1986.
Since then, however, the Irish pound has been remark-
ably stable, helped by the improvement in the budgetary
situation and a recovery in output growth.
Interest-rate differentials and nominal ex.
change rates
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Although the lanuary 1987 realignment within the ERM
had not involved the hish pound, expectations of a de-
valurtion persisted at the beginning of 1987 as budgetary
adjustment was postponed. However, when a series of
credible budgetary measures was taken in Ireland and
sterling strengthened, the credibility of the ERM com-
mitment increased, with a significant impact on interest
rates. By mid-l987, the Irish markets could ignore a rise
in UK interest rates. Since then a negative interest-rate
differential has prevailed between hish and UK short-
term rates.
However, in 1989 the strengthening of the DM pulled up
the narrow-band currencies against third currencies
(sterling and the US dollar among others), and this gave
rise to some expectations of a realignrpent. Short-term
interest rates were raised and differentials against the
DM and the FF increased in order to counter losses in
reserves. More recently, the position of the Irish pound
within the ERM has become more comfortable: first the
entry of sterling into the ERM has removed a major
potential source of instability for the lrish pound; sec-
ond, the relative weakness of the DM has allowed he-
land, like other narrow-band countries other than
Germany, to reduce short-term interest rates. Short-term
differentials against the DM now stand at the low level
of about 100 basis points.
... but brought stability and laid the basis for
growth...
During the period 1987 - early 1990 in particular, com-
mitment to the ERM, combined with budgetary adjust-
ment, brought very substantial benefits to lreland in
terms of the credibility of durable disinflation, and at a
time when economic growth was relatively strong. Dur-
ing this period, staying in close contact with the DM
provided the authorities with a policy target that was
both straightforward and, no doubt, appropriate. On the
whole, and in spite of occasional pressures, the hard
currency option taken by the lrish authorities seems to
have borne fruit. Although it is difficult to assess what
the situation would have been if the link with sterling
had been maintained, a comparison with the UK shows
that Ireland has achieved greater nominal stability and
higher growth of GDP in the second half of the 1980s.
... although at the cost of high real interest
rates.
Indeed, the stance of Irish monetary policy has resulted
in real interest rates being very high; they became posi-
tive in 1981 and climbed to reach very high levels by the
1985-87 period. They fell back to less than SVo in the
beginning of 1989 but rose again to over 87o, at the short
end, in March 1991.
ln part, the high level ofreal rates reflects world capital
market tightness, but Irish real rates are among the hig-
hest in the Community. The relatively high rates may
Irish and UK growth and inflation performance
suggest a problem of perception in the markets. Experi-
ence in the ERM would suggest that full credibility is
gained only slowly. Although the credibility of the auth-
orities'commitment to the nominal parity within the
ERM is stronger than in previous years, financial mar-
kets remain to be fully convinced. The risk premium on
hish rates will also reflect the still-high debt ratio which
implies vulnerability in the public finances.
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The prospects in EMU are potentially benefi-
cial...
In the context of economic and monetary union, the
smrll and open lrish economy faces both opportunities
end challenges. The recent success in Ireland's catching-
up performance suggests that the direction of Ireland's
mecroeconomic policy framework is broadly appropri-
ate. To the extent that greater integration reinforces this
policy framework rnd promotes the domestic conditions
for growth, the Irish economy can expect to perform well
in EIvtU. This benign view of the synergy between EMU
requirements and Ireland's catching-up performance is
not without question; disadvantages in terms of scale and
technological endowment and to some extent its periph-
eral location have been cited as possible impediments to
Ireland's success within economic union. While certain
sectors in the economy will undoubtedly be threatened
by greater integration, there is. evidence to suggest that
many other sectors will thrivea.
The main effect of monetary union will be the elimina-
tion of exchange risks. This corresponds to the removal
of e barrier and will be particularly beneficial for Irish
tradc. Indeed, having a distinct currency imposes a
greater burden on smaller than on larger countries; this
is beceuse smaller countries generally depend more on
trade than larger ones and there are relatively few inter-
national transactions denominated in their currencies.
lVhile imports will similarly benefit from reduced ex-
change rate risk, Ireland is likely to gain from monetary
union as a substantial net exporter .
At the same time, the absence of exchange risks will
greatly reduce interest-rate differentials other than
those reflecting credit standing and will, as long as the
union as a whole is expected to maintain a stability-
oriented policy, allow domestic rates to come down.
This will be beneficial for investment growth and em-
ployment, which are particularly important for lreland,
as it will increase the potential for further real conver-
gence and may reduce unemployment.
Moreover, this reduction in interest rates will lower
debt-servicing costs to the budget and will improve the
balance of payments through lower interest outflows to
outside holders of lrish-pound denominated debt.
The corresponding disadvantage is that keland will have
to forego the exchange-rate instrument completely and
its monetary policy to a very large extent. The existing
2.25% ERM margin still provides a certain degree of
protection from monetary shocks coming from the centre
of the system or from demand shocks in keland itself;
this will be lost. At the same time, it is likely that the
single monetary policy which will prevail in the mon-
etary union will continue to have an asymmetrical char-
acter. It is conceivable that targets could be set primarily
with reference to the needs of the major central areas,
independently of whether the periphery is in the same
phase of the cycle.
... provided nominal stability is maintained.
Nominal stability is essential for the successful passage
into the next phase of monetary union. As shown above,
inflation in heland has already converged; but it is im-
portant to maintain this performance.
Another critical condition is the degree of further pro-
gress in reducing the debt ratio, the imperative of which
was stressed earlier. As argued above, keeping to the
government's debt ratio reduction targets is likely, given
the missed opportunity to adjust further in 1989 and
1990, to involve some further discretionary budgetary
tightening in circumstances of less favourable short-nrn
growth. Such a tightening might, especially as the exter-
nal environment is now less favourable, be more likely
to have the sort of contractionary impact on demand
evident in the first half of the 1980s rather than the
benign impact of 1987-90. This is precisely because the
major progress in taking Ireland away from the brink of
debt unsustainability has already been made: savings
ratios are already lower than in 1987, and nominal inter-
est-rate differentials are already relatively low; so the
potential offsets to the traditional contractionary impact
of budgetary tightening are unlikely to play a further
major role.
Looking further ahead, an ambition of economic and
monetary union must be to provide a framework for
structural improvement leading to real income conver-
gence in heland. Spanish and Portuguese experience
tends to suggest that, to the extent that this ambition is
realized that there could be imbalances between supply
and demand. However, the impact on output, and thus on
inflation and employment, of such disturbances will be
greatly attenuated by the very high degree of openness
in the Irish economy.
4 See footnote l0 of Annex III.
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5. Conclusions
Macroeconomic performance in heland has improved
dramatically in recent years. The positive expectations
inspired by an abrupt change in economic regime in
1987, coupled with an improved external environment,
have facilitated a remarkable budgetary adjustment in
_conditions of strong growth. As a result, stability has
now been restored to the public finances. At the same
time, earlier progress in reducing inflation has been
safeguarded.
rilhile macroeconomic stabilisation has been achieved,
the Irish economy advances towards EMU with substan-
tial structural constraints primarily in the form of high
unemployment and a heavy public debt overhang. The
unemployment problem is largely the outcome of a struc-
tural shift in the economy during the 1980s in response
to a more open trading environment. In this respect, the
incentives deployed as part of the development strategy
pursued in recent decades have excessively targeted
capital-intensive projects.
If the profile of growth is to be made more consistent
with Ireland's factor endowments, the degree of commit-
ment evident in the successful macroeconomic adjust-
ment must be maintained and also be shown on structural
reform (particularly in areas such as taxation, industrial
policy and training). Some progress has already been
made in these areas; however, without a more radical
approach to structurel reform, the rchlevements in nomi-
nal and real convergence in the last decade will remain
fragile and the hish economy's capacity to address the
challenges of EMU will be weakened. Moreover, the
structure of the balance of payments suggests a need for
higher investment and implies scope for further structu-
ral improvement.
Exchange rate discipline has, in spite of occasional
pressures, achieved disinflation while the credible
policies applied since 1987 have ensured substantial
stability of the Irish pound in the ERM. Currently, the
ERM commitment has become easier in view of sterling
membership. The maintenance of inflation convergence
is indispensable in the approach to EMU. However, fun-
damental for maximizing the benefits and minimizing
the risks of greater integration is the degree of further
progress in reducing the debt ratio. The present high debt
overhang threatens the convergence achievements al-
ready made, especially as maintaining the downward
trajectory of the debt ratio will be more difficult with
weaker growth.
The approaching Union entails the elimination of ex-
change risks and will allow further reduction in interest
rates. Both benefits are especially relevant for smaller
and open countries like Ireland. However, as the Com-
mission's Report "One Market, One Money" points out
in relation to the regional distribution of the impact of
union, there are no a priori grounds for predicting the
pattern ofrelative gains and losses.
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Part II
SPECIAL TOPICS
Chapter I
Ireland's Budgetary Stabilization
1981-90
0. Introduction
For analytical purposes, heland's budgetary stabilisa-
tion can be divided into two inter-related phases:
Phase I (1Q81-86): which coincided with a disinflation
of the economy and in which repeated efforts to consoli-
date the public finances proved unsuccessfuh net bor-
rowing by general government remained stubbornly
rbove ll4o of GDP and the national debt/GDP ratio
(hereafter referred to as the debt ratio) spiralled to
tL6,59o.
Phase 2 (l q87-90): which coincided with a strong econ-
omic recovery and in which budgetary stabilisation has
been successfully achieved; net borrowing by general
government has been reduced to about 3,57o of GDP and
the trajectory in the debt ratio has been sharply reversed,
falling below 1007o in 1990.
The spectacular budgetary performance in this second
phase has focused much international attention on the
Irish experience as a possible model for general applica-
tion. In this respect, the relative importance of the dis-
cretionary and nondiscretionary elements of heland's
stabilisation effort is crucial. By comparing the two
phases of stabilisation in a formalised framework (IS-
LM and theoretical debt dynamics), this annex attempts
to identify the key factors underlying the success of the
second phase relative to the first. In particular, cyclical
fluctuations, movements in interest rates and exchange
rate effects are examined so as to isolate and compare
the contribution of discretionary fiscal policy to the
stabilisation effort in both phases. This analysis attempts
to provide a realistic assessment of Ireland's budgetary
performance in the 1980s and to identify some general
conditions for successful stabilisation. Finalln the me-
dium-term outlook for budgetary policy in Irelaud is
examined in the context of competing needs for accel-
erated consolidation on the macroeconomic level and
structural reform on the microeconomic level.
1. A successful budgetary stabilisation.
la. The drlft towards unsustalnablllty 1981.1986.
In 1986, Ireland's efforts at macroeconomic stabilisation
over the preceding five years were considered to have
failedl. While inflation had fallen close to the Com-
munity average and external balance was largely re-
stored, disinflation had been achieved at a high cost in
terms of lost output and high unemployment. Moreover,
severe and persistent disequilibria had emerged in the
public finances. Abudgetary expeliment in "pump-prim-
ing" the economy from mid-19772 had failed spectacu-
larly. An initial improvement in economic growth had
not been sustained and nominal instability in the econ-
omy had been aggravated as substantial public deficits
were increasingly reflected in a widening of the external
current deficit. Between 1977 and 1981, net borrowing
by general government had more than doubled in terms
of GDP and the debt ratio had begun to rise steeply. (See
Table I for trend in main budgetary aggregates).
As lreland's procyclical fiscal stance coincided with
countercyclical measures elsewhere in the Community,
credibility in the parity of the punt within the ERM
(from 1979 onwards) was eroded. Deteriorating finan-
cial market sentiment was reflected in a widening of the
interest rate differential with Germany. By 1981, fiscal
consolidation had joined disinflation as a primary focus
of macroeconomic policy. Despite a concerted attempt
at fiscal consolidation in the next five years, a 'snow-
balling" in interest payments on the rising public debt
meant that total net borrowing remained above 11% of
1
2
See Dombusch R.:" Credibility, debt and unemplo5rmenu lreland's failed stabilisation". Economic Policy (1989).
ln 1977, a new govemment programme had attempted to shift the economy onto a higher trend growth path by means of a
massive fiscal stimulus transmit ed via reduced taxation, public expenditure and pubtc sectoremploymentcreation.
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GDP throughout the period and the debt racio spiralled
to L16,5% (See Graph 1.1 and 1.2).
By 1986, the Irish economy was close to crisis as the
public finances drifted towards unsustainability. An ap-
preciation in the real punt/sterling exchange rate during
1986 threatened a further competitiveness squeeze in
IJK markets. The likelihood of another major rationali-
sation of labour in the already much depleted traditional
(and UK-dependent) sectors of the economy posed a
policy dilemma between exchange rate discipline and
maintaining competitiveness'. fire authorities opted for
realignment and the value of the punt was unilaterally
adjusted downward (by 87o) within the ERM in August
19864. The breach of exchange rate discipline confirmed
long-held suspicions in the financial markets concerning
keland's ERM commitment. The fear of subsequent re-
alignments (as sterling 
_continued to slide) resulted in
substantial capital flight) and spiralling short term inter-
est rates.
lb. A change ln macroeconomlc and budgetary
pollcy reglme.
Faced with a looming crisis, the new government
(elected February 1987) immediately set about reinforc-
ing the macro-economic policy mix. The commitment to
ERM parity was reaffirmed and the social consensus,
abandoned in 1981, was reactivated. The key elements
of the new consensus covering the period 1987-90 were
a centralised incomes policy limiting nominal wage
growth close to anticipated inflation and a medium-term
fiscal programme. The main elements in the fiscal pro-
gramme were:
a) stabilisation of the trajectory in the debt ratio;
b) stabilisation to be achieved through a phased re-
duction in net borrowing by government to be-
tween 5% rnd 69o of GDP (from Ll,2% of GDP in
1986);
c) consolidation of the borrowing requirement to be
achieved by means of a reduction in the share of
public expenditure in GDP rather than by an in-
crease in the already onerous levels of taxation;
d) some limited tax relief (to r cumulative value of
about 2Vo of GDP) over the programme period to
underpin moderation in wage growth;
e) the real value of total social welfare expenditure to
be maintained but with improved targeting of reci-
pients.
lc. The process of budgetary adJustment.
While the programme targets were ambitious and the
path of adjustment yague, budgetary stabilisation was
rapidly achieved. Indeed, up to last year, budgetary tar-
gets had been repeatedly "overachieved" to an extent
that the upward trajectory in the debt ratio has been
3
4
This dilemma was more apparent than real when considerr:l in the context of the previous ineffectiveness of derraluation in
the Irish economy with tsansmission lags in imported infla,ion very short and no effective incomes policy in operation.
A further depreciation of sterling in the lafier part of 1986, subsequently reversed the competitiveness gains from the August
devaluation
Estimated at about 8% of GDP despite the existence of exchange controls.
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against the background of the current budget deficit. tn
this respect, France stands out as having one of the best
budgetary situations in the Community i.e. the fact that
France has a high explicit tax burden does not have a
counterpart in much higher expenditures than in most
other Community countries.
2.5.2 Company taxatlon
Since the degree of capital mobility is far higher than the
mobility of labour in the integrating European economy,
the level of company taxation is crucial to comp€titive
performance. In France corporations are heavily taxed if
account is taken of the whole tax burden. In 1989, the
overall average tax burden (without social security con-
tributions and net ofsubsidies) was l09o ofvalue added
compared to around 67o in Germany.
The high rate of social conributions may affect not only
the operating results of enterprises, but also the dispos-
able income and spending behaviour of households.
Until now, it seems that the wage level has compensated
for the high level of social security contribution, thus
reducing the effect on unit labour costs. However, the
non-progressive rates of social contributions and their
ceiling system, still existing for pension contributions,
penalise low salary earners. The institution of the Coti-
sation Sociale Gdn6ralis6e aims to correct this distortion
and represents the first step towards a global revision of
the financing of the social security system by a widening
of the basis of social contributions to capital and non-sa-
lary incomes.
2.5.3 Taxatlon of savlngs
The Law of Finance of 1989 has substantially revised the
taxation of saving in order to make the system consistent
with liberalized capital flows and to reduce the tax-in-
duced distortions between financial assets. These new
measures have been taken not only to avoid the danger
of French saving outflow to abroad, but also to adapt
taxation to the new financial products stemming from
capital market deregulation.
Previous tax rules have led to financial market segmen-
tation which was inconsistent with an optimal allocation
of financial resources. Therefore, the most recent taxa-
tion is aiming at the equalization of tax presslue on
financial assets. In fact, the income of a large part of
French financial saving is not taxed ar l8.l% (including
3.1(o for social security).
Financial deregulations have led to a progressive de-
crease in the outstanding amount of savings-bank books
(whose interest income is low because it is administered
but tax-exempt) at the advantage of competing financial
assets, with the same degree of liquidity, but with a
higher market yield. The success of monetary SICAV is
the proof of this new allocation process by market rules.
Nevertheless, the size of the outstanding savings-bank
deposits still remains high, despite this recent dwind-
ling, and the taxation of distributed profits to stoGk-hol-
ders is higher than taxation of interest income on bonds
despite the tax credit on dividends. However, this fiscal
handicap on share income has been strongly reduced
thanks to a tax rate on capital gains equal to that on
interest iucome (l8.l7o). This measure has led to the
development of the "SICAV de capitalisation", which are
allowed to transform the distributed dividends on the
shares in their portfolio into capital gains.
To facilitate the financing of investment by long-term
financial resources, French authorities have created a
new tax-exempt asset, le P.E.P. (Plan d'Epargne Popu-
laire), which allows savers to earn a tax-exempt market
interest rate against a long term financial engagement.
All in all, these fiscal measures are aiming at the devel-
opment of financial saving and at its more efficient
allocation. Nevertheless, some tax induced distortions
and rigidities still remain: they should be reduced in
order to allow an efficient financing of productive in-
vestment,
2.5.4 Direct taxation
Direct taxation of household income was only just over
4Vo of GDP in 1990. It is an annual tax charged on the
total net income of individual households. The pro-
gressive tax structure takes account of the dependants in
the household (e.g. number of children) and applies to
all the various types of income net of deductions, allow-
ances and charges, Income tax revenues grew sharply for
25 years, but slowed down markedly as a result of the
series of reliefs introduced in 1985, which brought the
top rate of tax down from 657o to 56.8{o and extended
the system of graduated relief. The effect has been to
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take some two million people out of tax altogether, and
to reduce the amount of tax paid for a further two million.
In comparison with the other European countries, in-
come tax is of limited importance within the French tax
system. This can be explained, firstly, by the low rates
charged in the first income brackets (the lowest rate is
57o compared with 25Vo in the United Kingdom) and
second by the narrowness of the tax base' Taking into
account allowances and various deductions, the low
rates charged in the first income brackets, the system of
graduated relief and the exemption from paying small
amounts of tax, the tax base is so narow that many
taxpayers do not reach the minimum taxation threshold
(487o ofFrench households are tax-exempted).
Because of the high progressivity of the tax tarrif in the
very high income groups, only high income earners ac-
tually contribute efficiently to tax receipt. In 1986, 17o
of households declaring the highest incomes paid 27Vo
of tax and lOTo of households paid 64Vo of tax' The tax
rules in force therefore favour low and middle-income
taxpayers. However, these conclusions would be quali-
fied if the amount of social security contributions paid
was added to income tax.
2.5.5 Indirect taxes
Value added tax (net of VAT receipts transferred to the
EC budget) represented 7.47o of GDP in 1990, more than
one percentage point less than in 1980' The VAI system
has been strongly modified as the number of rates has
been reduced from 7 to3 (5.5Vo,18.6%, 224o).Moreovet,
the French authorities have on several occasions lowered
the upper rate, bringing it closer to the normal rate' As
the other excise duties are on average slightly below the
level of other countries, indirect taxation does not re-
quire significant fufiher adjustment in view of the inter-
nal market.
-+
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Ireland's Budgetary Stabilisation Utf-90
Phese 1 (1q81-86)3
The need for budgetary consolidation in 1 9 8 1 coincided
with a marked slowdown in world trade reflecting a
generalised tendency to w ards di sinllationary p ol icies in
the wake of the second oil shock. The nominal punt
exchange rate was constrained within the ERM narrow
band so that compensatory expenditure-switching
measures to accompany the fiscal consolidation were
largely precluded6 . Nominal exchange rate parity was
squeezing export competitiveness as the domestic disin-
flation process began to bite and the real effective punt
exchange rate was appreciating sharplyT. In conse-
quence, activity in the economy was constrained by
weakness in the external sectors (particularly traditional
exporting sectors).
Capital controls had been introduced on entry to the
ERM but substantial unidentified outflows since then
indicated that these were of only limited effect. Interna-
tional trends, therefore, resulted in a return to positive
and rising real interest rates in the Irish economy, further
depressing demand and offsetting any limited "crowding
in" which might have been associated with fiscal con-
solidation. The consolidation was to be achieved via
increased taxation so that any supply-side effects were
likely to be negative. Finalln there is evidence that an
anticipation of impending fiscal consolidation (or alter-
natively an inflationary realignment within the ERM)
was depressing economic activity via a negative expec-
tations effect. With economic growth already weakened
by the disinflationary environment (domestic and exter-
nal), unemployment rising and real interest rates turning
positive, the conditions for a successful budgetary sta-
bilisation were far from ideal.
In this first phase of stabilisation, the average primary
balance required to stabilise the public debt ratio (f')
over the period 1981-86 had increased significantly
relative to earlier years (see Table 2). In the period
1974-80, f- had averaged at -4,77o of GDP, while in the
period 1981- 1986 the average had increased to + 0,57o.
Thus, the average primary balance required to stabilise
the debt ratio moved from a substantial deficit in the
pre-stabilisation period to a small surplus in the first
phase of the stabilisation effort. This increase in the
primary balance required to stabilise the debt ratio re-
flected the internal dynamic of the rising debt ratio,
exacerbated by the coincidence of low economic growth
as world trade declined and rising real interest rates in
line with international trends; there was also a signifi-
cant revaluation effect (reflecting the combined effect of
exchange rate movements and the rising level of foreign-
currency indebtedness) over the latter period.
It was essential, therefore, that the primary deficit (6?o
of GDP in 1981) be sufficiently reduced to compensate.
Table 2 indicates that the average primary deficit (f) was
indeed reduced over the period but remained below the
average(f'). In consequence, the public debt ratio rose
steadily. As the debt ratio rose and the interestrate/valu-
ation - output differential expanded, a progressively
larger primary adjustment was necessary to restore sta-
bility. Despite the reduction in the primary deficit, the
gap between f and f'(the "stability gap") widened as the
budgetary authorities found themselves chasing an ac-
celerating target f" (see Graph 1.3).
Graph 1.4 decomposes the growth in the debt ratio into
the effects of the primary balance, the interest rate,
economic growth and stock-flow effects. A falling con-
tribution from the primary balance in this first phase of
stabilisation is evident but the coincidence of a rising
interest burden (the "snowballing" effect) and falling
growth is reflected in the change of sign in the contribu-
tion of the I-G component after 1982. The substantial
impact of revaluation (through the stock-flow adjust-
ment) on the debt ratio trajectory is also evident in the
years of the two realignments within the ERM - 1983 and
1986.
Realignment within the ERM was technically possible but was counter to the disinflationary objectives underlying
mernbership of the mechanism. Ireland did not avail of opportun;ries to devalue in ttre frst four yean of ERM membership
although &valuations were made in 1983 and 1986.
Real appreciation reflected a simultaneous nominal depreciation in sterling and an inflation differential wih trading partrers
wi0rin tlre ERM. However, while 0re traditional exporting sectors suffered a sharp decline, a buoyant performance by the
modem high-productivity (and foreign-based) secton maintained export volumes at a high level.
ABLE 2: Steblllty condltlons lo the lrlsh publlc dcbt
retlo 197t1-90
Period
1974-80 4,7 4,5
1981-86 -\7 {{J
1987-90 +3,8 {O,8
f f" f-f*
-0,2
-3,2
+3,0
Ex post calculations of fr arc made aeording to drc formula
f=ffi.u,-,
wherp
i= thc implicit nomind intcrcst rrtr o tlre debf
G= tbegrowthratcofnominalGDP
V = the ex post stock-flow adjustment in thc value of thc det*
expressed as a percentage oftolal
This formuls differs from the stability ccrditicr &rivcd at @). Thc
stock-flow adjuslment variable (V) provides forthc valuetior dfectr
of exchange ratc movements, ottrrtanding balanccr of gcneral
govemment, discounting ac on thc public &bt
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Phase 2: 1487-tQaO
Economic conditions in the second phase of heland's
stabilisation improved considerably as the international
economy entered apronounced upswing. heland's disin-
flation was complete so that real appreciation in the
exchange rate had largely stopped. The impact on exter-
nal demand of accelerating world trade and improved
competitiveness would be expected to compensate for
any loss of internal demand rssociated with a further
fiscal tightening. In 1987, export volumes increased by
more than 13% pushing the external current account into
surplus for the first time in a quarter of a century and it
has remained in surplus since then.
As credibility in the new consensus-based budgetary and
exchange rate regime was rapidly established, there was
a positive expectations effect reflected in a narrowing of
domestic interest rate differentials. The fall in domestic
rates, also facilitated by a generalised easing in interna-
tional money markets, allowed the benefits of the inter-
national economic recovery to be transmitted to the
domestic economy. As the consolidation was to be
achieved by expenditure reductions facilitating relief in
fiscal pressure, some positive supply-side effects were
also to be expected. The reduction in income tax over the
past four years has supported growth in real disposable
income while underpinning the moderate evolution in
wages. Finally, as the economy steadily improved, posi-
tive expectations intensified and boosted private con-
sumption in particular. In the first half of 1989, this
effect was so strong as to suggest that theeconomy might
be overheating but a subsequent tightening of monetary
conditions within the ERM averted any difficulties in
this respect. Thus, in contrast to the first phase, this
second stabilisation phase took place at I very frvour-
able stage in the macroeconomic cycle.
ln the context of the debt stability conditions introduced
above, we can now examine the anatomy of the specta-
cularly successful stabilisation in a more formalised
manner. The final column of Table 2 indicates the sta-
bility conditions in the debt ratio in this phase of adjust-
ment. The fall in the effective interest rate associated
with market trendsE, the sharp export-led recovery in
economic growth and the limitation of stock-flow adjust-
ments due to improved exchange rate perforurance are
evident from Graph1.4. This favourable coincidencc in
trends is reflected in the substantially more moderate
rise in the average f' over the period 1937-90 relative to
the period 1981-86. The intensified consolidation effort
supported by stronger economic growth has simulta-
neously boosted the primary balance f above F yielding
a positive stability gap and a declining debt ratio since
mid 1988 (see Fig 3). More importantly, the explosive
dynamic in the debt ratio, which characterised the first
phase of adjustment has been replaced by an opposite
dynamic ensuring a steady reduction in the debt ratio
over time if the present conditions are maintained.
A comparison:
In comparing the two phases of lreland's stabilisation,
attention should focus on the stability condition f=f'. [n
both phases, the primary balance f was significantly
8 It strould be rpted that high domestic interest rates since late 1989, despite historically bw levels of infl*ion, has prshed the
real effective interestrate up again.
(4)
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improved but in phase 1, the improvement in the primary
balance was not sufficient to offset the sharp increase in
the stabilising balance f'. In consequence, the debt ratio
increased without intemrption. In the second phase, the
increase in f'was very modest so that the consolidation
of the primary balance was sufficient to stabilise and
ultimately reverse the upward trajectory in the debt ratio.
Thus, the difference between the two phases would ap-
pear to relate more to movements in the stabilising bal-
ance f'than to changes in the primary balance f. While
thtr rlaDror of adjusment (and the underlying politi-
cal/social consensus) in the second phase will have been
important, the mo-st significant positive influence on the
determinants of f' will have come from exogenous fac-
tors like favourable world hade and international inter-
est rete developments. This, in turn, suggests that the
success of the second phase of stabilisation relative to
the first may be less attributable to discretionary fiscal
measures than is immediately apparent.
Strictly speaking, the failure of lreland's first stabilisa-
tion phase can be attributed to a policy failure i.e. an
inadequate reduction in the primary deficit. This is par-
ticularly true in the early years of adjustment when
negative real interest rates provided an excellent pros-
pect for stabilisation. Later in this phase, the operation
of the automatic stabilisers as the economy slowed and
a sharp deterioration in the underlying debt dynamics
made narrowing the 'stability gap" considerably more
difficult. The stabilisation effort was not helped by a
heavy reliance on tax increases rather than more exten-
sive cuts in public expenditureg. A reduction in the pub-
lic sector share of output might have induced some
compensatory'crowding in" effects (albeit limited due
to size of the fiscal multiplier) and induced an expecta-
tionsdriven recovery in private consumption; the in-
erease in fiscal prcssure simply depressed the economy
further and eventually encountered diminishing returns.
On the other hand, it might also be argued that a more
rapid response from the budgetary authorities was not
feasible. The primary balance was consolidated by 1,5%
of GDP in 1981 and by more than 2% of GDP in 1982
without success in stabilising the debt ratio.
Despite the inadequacies of the fiscal policy response in
the first phase, the marked improvement in macroecon-
omic conditions after 1986 intuitively suggests that cy-
clical factors have played a very significant role in the
successful stabilisation in the second phase. While fiscal
policy was again significantly tightened after 1986, the
macroeconomic environment in phase 2 was much more
conducive to budgetary stabilisation. As a small open
economy in the ERM, the capacity of the domestic auth-
orities to influence the real interest rate - output factor
(r-g) is timitedlo. In the context of the budgetary stabili-
sation process, movements in the these determinants are
largely non discretionary. The only instrument available
to the domestic authorities in directly influencing the
stability conditions in the debt ratio is the primary bal-
ance f". If the Irish experience is to act as a model of
budgetary adjustment, it is this discretionary element of
the stabilisation process which is of most interest.
2d. The dlscretlonary element of freland's
stablllsatlon.
In comparing the discretionary elements of the two
phases of stabilisation attention should focus on the
primary balance (f).The appropriate measure of discre-
tionary fiscal policy is the cyclically-adjusted primary
balance". This measure abstracts from the impact of
growth and interest rates and so will more accurately
indicate the extent of the policy-induced adjustment
underlying the spectacular figures between 1987 and
1990. The trend in the cyclically-adjusted primary bal-
ance is presented in Graph 1.5. Using this measure, the
underlying stance of fiscal policy in both phases of
adjustment has been clearly restrictive but the discre-
tionary tightening of policy has been much less in the
second than in the first.
10
1l
Public investment was reduced substantially h the early years of adjustment (1981-83) but this reflected the termination of
specific pojects (e.g. the natual gas pipeline, electricity generating plant etc) rather than an activist consolidation effort
Although the differential between domestic and intemational rates (q) is clearly determined by domestic consideratione..
The primary balane influences etability conditions in the debt ratio directly through raising/lowering f but also indirectly by
raising/lowering f' via the pace of debt accumulation.
Cyclical adjusEnent of the prirnary balance for Ireland presents some theoretical difficulties. The cyclical position of the
ecoil)my is conventionally deternrined using an Okun co efficient expressing movernents in the gap between actual and
potential ouput as a function of the unemployment rate. In the 1987-88 period, the hish economy was growing very sfrongly
bul contary b theorefical prediction, unemployment continued to rise. As a result the cyclical adjustment of the primary
balanoe over the secotd phase of stabilisation is pobably somewhat underestirnated. Despite the shortcomings in this
approach, the use of the cyclically-adjusted pimary balance is recommended by Blarrchard as the best ildicator of
discretionary fiecal policy. See BlanchardO. : OECD Working Papers 1990.
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The implication of this result is twofold
i) cyclical factors were indeed very significant in
the spectacular success ofphase 2 rclalive to phase
1.
and
i0 much of the basis for the successful stabilisation in
the second phase was laid by the discretionary
policy adjustment in the earlier less successful
phase.
Greph lJ: Cycllcrlly.edJusted prlmery brlrnce, t9El.90
3. An expansionary fiscal contraction?
An important aspect of assessing the discretionary ele-
ment of freland's stabilisation effort is the possibility
that the consolidation itself may have influenced the
economic cycle thro.qgh "crowding in" and/or positive
expectations effects". If so, a cyclically-adjusted pri-
mary surplus would tend to understate the effectiveness
of consolidation in the second phase relative to the first.
Trends in internal demand over the period 1987-90 sug-
gest only a limited negative effect from the frrrther tight-
ening of the fiscal stance. lYhile internal demand
declined slightly in 1987, it recovered strongly in the
subsequent years and is now the main source of growth
in the economy.
The relatively benign impact of the fiscal consolidation
on the domestic economy may indeed reflect a positive
expectations response to improved budgetary condi-
tions. Undoubtedly, the fall in the share of public expen-
diture in GDP facilitating a simultaneous reduction in
interest rates and fiscal pressure will have induced a
positive private sector response. However, the apparent
absence ofa negative output effect ofthe fiscal contrac-
tion after 1986 will also have reflected the extent to
which the further tightening of policy was already antici-
pated in 1986''. The possibility of an imminent budge-
tary adjustment or an inflationary devaluation impacts
negatively on private sector expectations resulting in
precautionary savings and higher interest rates induced
by capital outflows. The sharp rise in the savings ratio
and the substantial capital flight evident after the 1986
punt realignment tends to support this view. The impli-
cation is that much of the negative impact of the sub-
seguent adjustment was already being felt in 1986.
The change in budgetary regime acquired immediate
credibility restoring the private sector confidence which
had been lost particularly towards the end of the first
phase. The savings rate remained high in 1987 but pri-
vate consumption did not fall below its 1986 level. (In
the subsequent years private consumption has grown at
moderate rates partly reflecting a return to high real
interest rates.) Therefore, the notion of an "expansionary
fiscal contraction" must be applied with caution to ke-
land's stabilisation. The apparently benign macroecon-
omic impact of the second phase of stabilisation may
have reflected the extent to which many of the negative
aspects of the consolidation had already been discounted
by private agents in the first phase. This would reinforce
rather than weaken the conclusion that discretionary (i.e.
net of cyclical elements) tightening of fiscal policy was
at least as great in the first stabilisation phase as in the
second phase which was considerably more successful.
13 Interest in this phenomenon has been revived in recent years. See Giavazzi and Pagano: "An expansionary fiscal contaction:
the cases of Denmark and keland" Economic Review (1989) and McAleese: "Ireland-The economy is doing well, there is
talk of an hish miracle." Europe-Magazine of the European Community (1989).
See Fitrgerald J: " Issues in the National Debt" Economic and Social Review (1986).14
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4. General lessons for budgetary stabilisation.
The Irish budgetary stabilisation is frequently described
as a "miracle". On the basis of the analysis above, this
is clearly inaccurate. Much of the budgetary success
achieved by heland in the second phase (and the lack of
success in the first phase) can be attributed to the mac-
roeconomic conditions in which the adjustment took
place. This does not detract from the courageous budge-
tary decisions taken by the national authorities in 1987,
when the prospects for the economy looked considerably
more gloomy than turned out to be the case. However, it
is important to avoid any general conclusion that cou-
rageous decisions alone will guarantee a painless budge-
tary stabilisation. Moreover, the sensitivity of the debt
dynamics to cyclical moyements in the economy points
to the need for continued vigilance in the control ofnet
borrowing even when stabilisation has been achieved.
From this examination of the contrasting phases of lre-
land's budgetary stabilisation a number of intuitive ob-
servations on the basic requirements for a successful
stabilisation can be made:lf
a) the timing of the stabilisation effort in terms of the
economy's growth cycle is crucial to the outcome.
If the momentum in the economy is already slow-
ing, the negative impacts of a fiscal consolidation
will not be cushioned by growth from other sour-
ces. Low growth will further hinder attempts at
successful consolidation through the operation of
the automatic stabilisers.
b) the interest rate cycle is clearly important for sta-
bilisation. In periods of high real interest rates,
implying lower growth in the economy, dynamic
stability in the debt ratio will be more difficult to
attain. A credible policy to reduce disequilibria in
the public finances should reduce risk premia on
domestic rates. However, in conditions of free
capital mobilitn it is international money markets
which will ultimately determine the extent to
which the effective interest rate on the public debt
can be reduced. It is worth noting that despite a
substantial narrowing in risk premia in Ireland
since 1987, real interest rates remain among the
highest in the Community.
c) the pace of adjustment is a further determinant of
the success of stabilisation. A front-loading of the
stabilisation effort is generally preferable to a more
gradualist approaoh, as the internal dynamic of a
rising debt ratio requires a progressively larger
adjustment so long as stabilisation is postponed.
The Irish experience clearly shows that a deterior-
ation in economic conditions in the course of a
more protracted stabilisation effort can rapidly
drive the public finances towards unsustainability.
A front-loading of the stabilisation effort will also
help to establish early credibility in the effort new
budgetary regime, which is important to ensure a
positive expectations response.
d) the manner of the budgetary adjustment is also
important. While the aggregate-demand impact of
increased taxation may be lessro, experience sug-
gests that in most developed countries a reduction
in public expenditure is a superior method of sta-
bilisation. However, the appropriatene$ of this
recommendation will of course depend on the scele
of the stabilisation effort required and the existing
structure of the public finances. In lreland's case,
an excessive reliance on increased tax pressure in
the first phase of stabilisation simply accentuated
the slowdown in economic activity and ultimately
encountered diminishing marginal returns. The
second phase relied exclusively on expenditure re-
ductions which induced a more favourable supply-
side response than increasing tax pressure. (To this
extent, the choice of expenditure rather than taxa-
tion as the adjustment channel may afford the do-
mestic authorities some influence on the stabilising
primary balance f' by positively affecting the real
growth rate g.)
5. Whither budgetary policy in Ireland?
The success of Ireland's second phase of budgetary ad-
justment has completely altered the medium-term out-
look for the oublic finances. On the basis of official
documentslT, the current medium-term strategy aims
for:
15 Theoreticalln a &valuation of the currency will also help to boost short-run extemal demand in the ecorcmy and so to
compensate for losses in intemal demand arising &om the fiscal contraction. It is not included here because the use of
expenditure switching as part of a budgetary stabilisation is a delicate operation and may undermine other stability objtrrives.
Firstly, it is important that the devaluation be perceived as a "once-off' adjustment if credibility in the stabilisation
programme is not to be undermined. Secondly, in an open economy, a devaluation must be rccompanied by some form of
incomes control if 0re competitiveness gains are not to be lost through a wage inflation. Finally, if a substantial proportion of
the public debt is denominated in foreign currencies, the impact of revaluation on the debt ratio dynamics should also be
considered in the formulation of exchange rate policy.
Theoreticolly, the multiplier impact of a reduction in govemment expenditure is greater than that of increased taxation
because of leakage through savings.
The Programme for Govemment 1989 and 0re Programme for Economic and Social Progress l9l-93.
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a)
b)
a reduction in the debt ratio towards 907oby 1993
with a view to a further reduction to below 70%by
2000tt; this is to be achieved through the elimina-
tion of gross dissaving by central government and
continued tight control on the level of total net
borrowing.
continued reductions in income tax rates to a stand-
ard rate of 25% (now 29%) and a single higher rate
of.48% (now 527o) and a reduction in indirect tax
rates (VAT and excise duties) to bring them more
into line with those of main Community partners.
extension of the existing tax base and further sim-
plification of the taxation system.
a commitment to maintain the real value of trans-
fers while continuing efforts to improve targeting.
The measures outlined in the recent Programme for
Economic and Social Progress are likely to impose
a significant additional burden on public expendi-
ture.
This medium-term strategy reflects two parallel but not
always compatible objectives for budgetary policy post
stabilisation: the need to reduce the debt ratio as quickly
as possible for reasons of macroeconomic efficiency and
the need to improve microeconomic efficiency through
tax reform. The broadly neutral 1991 Budget (with prac-
tically no change in programmed borrowing in terms of
GDP) reflects a delicate trade-off between these objec-
tives with some reductions in taxation (largely offset by
increases elsewhere) and continued tight control on ex-
penditure.
5a. Reasons for accelerated consolldatlon.
So long as a favourable output and interest rate environ-
ment prevails, the strong implosive dynamic in the debt
ratio will ensure a steady downward trajectory without
further increasing the primary surplus. Assuming a
gradual narrowing in domestic interest rate differentials
as the debt ratio improves and an annual economic
growth rate of 3%r9, f' can be expected to fall over the
next decade. On this basis, the official medium and
long-term debt ratio targets are achievable as illustrated
in Graph 1.6. This would leave the debt ratio at close to
?0Vo of GDP by 2000 compared to a peak of 118,57o in
1989.
There are, however, some convincing arguments for an
even more rapid consolidation of the debt ratio:
a) the favourable "stability gap" of more recent years
cannot be guaranteed even in the medium term. A
deterioration in the stability conditions underlying
the debt ratio could make continued consolidation
much more difficult arguing for as accelerated a
consolidation as possible, while conditions are fa-
vourable. In this respect, the failure to make greater
progress in financial 1989 and 1990 might be seen
as an opportunity lost. In Table 3 below, the sensi-
tivity of the internal dynamic of the hish debt ratio
is tested by examining various scenarios involving
different assumptions on trend effective interest
rates, output and the primary surplus. The revalu-
ation effect is assumed at zero across the period.
Clearly any reduction of the primary surplus would
be inconsistent with the official medium-term
strategy. A tightening of the primary surplus from
an already high5% to 67o would yield a significant
improvement in the debt ratio trajectory but might
not be politically feasible.
It is impossible to determine, a priori, the optimal
debt/GDP ratio for Ireland but a very high debt
ratio is likely to imply a continued risk premium
on domestic interest rates. To the extent that a
lower debt ratio would further nalrow intercst rate
differentials, an accelerated consolidation would
be desirable. In the current situation, approxima-
tion to the Community average would imply a debt
ratio of about 607o. Table 4 provides the likely
timescale for reduction of the hish debt ratio to this
level under various assumptions on the primary
balance (f) and the interest rate - output gaP (r-S).
In the context of EMU, a more rapid convergence
towards the Community average might be an aP-
propriate longer-term objective. Monetary union
c)
d)
b)
c)
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with irrevocably fixed exchange rates will reduce
risk premia but the risk of extemal shocks reguires
that the maximum scope for short-term stabilisa-
tion measures be created and maintained.
5b. Thx reform and the consolldatlon effort.
The need for tax reform remains the other major issue in
Ireland's medium-term budgetary strategy. As part of the
first phase ofbudgetary consolidation, fiscal pressure in
the economy increased from about 37,79o of GDP in
1980 to about 42,5Vo of GDP in 1986. Although the
existing overall tax burden in Ireland (about 39,5% in
1990) is not excessive by Community standards (EURl2
averege of about 43,5% in 1990), the narrowness of the
Irish tax base has resulted in uneven incidence and high
marginal rates at low thresholds. In particular, taxation
of labour income is high, representing about 847o of
direct tax receipts and 3O% of total receipts. The heavy
tax burden on labour income has resulted in a substantial
"$,edge" between gross and net wages, which acts as a
significant disincentive to labour demand and supply. It
is the narrowing of this tax wedge and a rebalancing of
relative prices between labour and other production
factors, which must underlie any tax reform.
The pace of tax reform to date has been determined by
the need for restraint in fiscal policy. The relatively
favourable conditions in the more recent phase of budge-
tary consolidation have allowed for an uncompensated
reduction in the tax burden on labour and consumer
expenditure since 1987 without endangering medium-
term targets for the debt ratio. In less favourable condi-
tions, howeveq such reductions may not be consistent
with continued accelerated reduction of the debt ratio.
This apparent incompatibility between accelerated re-
duction in the debt ratio and further reductions in taxa-
tion of labour income can be overcome by a
revenue-neutral approach to tax reform. Such I tax re-
form would be based on the now conventional approach
of simultaneously widening the tax base and harmoni-
sing effective rates across sources.
A wide-ranging tax reform will need to be presented as
a "package" in which losses (through higher taxation in
some areas) and gains (through reduced taxation in other
areas) are transparent. Otherwise, resistance from mi-
nority interest groups to individual changes would risk
undermining the entire reforrn process. The main targets
in a reform package would be:
a) the income tar system where the burden on labour
income might be eased while the burden on capital
and corporation profits might be increased. Effec-
tive tax rates on capital remain low reflecting pref-
erential taxation of profits in manufaoturing. While
the abolition of the special tax relief on export
profits has raised the share of corporation taxation
in total receipts, this increase also reflects a very
substantial recovery in profitability in the Idsh
economy since 1987.
b) indirect taxation where adjustments to the VAT and
excise base will be determined by the requirements
of the single market. Since 1986, the standard VAT
rate has fallen from 25% to 2lVo while the reduced
rates of 57o aad l0% have been replaced with two
intermediate rates of lO% and 12,5?oi a zero VAf
rate still applies to a significant portion of the
expenditure tax base. The excise system has been
streamlined somewhat by the abolition of minor
excise duties. The standard VAT changes made so
far, coupled with convergent movements in the
corresponding UK rate, suggest that little further
adjustment is required in that respect. Some further
modification of the excise system is required.
c) residential property taxes which were largely abol-
ished in the late 1970s; a tax on property is attrac-
tive as a stable source ofrevenue.
Some progress in reforming income taxation and indirect
taxation has been made since 1987. For reasons of
microeconomic efficiency, the tax reform process should
continue and the medium-term strategy provides for fur-
ther reductions in income tax rates and indirect taxes. On
a current basis, however, the changes in income tax and
indirect tax rates imply a reduction in revenue. In view
of the need to maintain the consolidation effort, it is
essential therefore that these further reductions in tax
rates be accompanied by compensatory widening of the
tax base.
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6, Conclusions.
Although heland has achieved a remarkable budgetary
stabilisation since 1987, the adjustment process began
much earlier in 1981. The first phase of the stabilisation
effort 1981-86 failed because the extent and nature ofthe
discretionary fiscal consolidation was not adequate to
compensate for the explosive debt dynamic set in motion
by low growth, high real interest rates and exchange rate
instability. Tbe success of the second stage of stabilisa-
tion 1987-90 coincided with further discretionary tight-
ening of fiscal policy but was substantially determined
by a more favourable trend in output, real interest rates
and a more stable exchange rate.
The lessons for general application to be drawn from the
kish experience are that the timing of the adjustment (in
terms of growth and interest rate cycles) and the nature
of the adjustment process itself (in terms of the pace and
credibility of the consolidation effort, expenditure cuts
versus tax increases) are crucial to the success of rny
stabilisation effort. If appropriate, 8'once and for all"
devaluation of the currency to boost extemal demand in
compensation for the fall in internal demand may also
prove useful but only if accompanied by a binding in-
comes policy.
As Irish budgetary policy enters a post-stabilisation
phase, competing demands are emerging. Accelerated
consolidation of the debt is clearly desirable to reduoe
vulnerability in the economy particularly in anticipation
of EMU. However, microeconomic efficiency requires
that distortions created by the tax system should be
removed via a process of reform. Given the need to
maintain the consolidation effort, tax reform should be
broadly revenue-neutral with any reduction in rates com-
pensated by widening of the base.
* This chapter was mainly prepared by S. Benigan of the National Economies Directorate.
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APPENDIX A
A fiscal contraction in IS-LM framework for a small open economy
with fixed exchange rates and capital mobility.
The diagram above sets up the standard IS-LM frame- The LM curve descibes the combinations of r and y
work adopted for a small open ecouomy with perfect which will maintain equilibrium in the money market.
capital mobility. The IS curve describes the combina- The money market equilibrium condition may be written
tions of real interest rates (r) and income (y) which will as
maintain equilibrium in the product market. The producr LM: M/p = l(r) + k(y) (3)market equilibrium position may be written as: 
where
lvllP = the real money supply
I = the speculative demand fqr money
k = the transactions demand for money
The slope of the LM curve is derived by totally differen-
tiating equation (3) so that
0 = I'dr + k'dy (4)
Rearranging we obtain
drtdy 
= -l Ha)r
As k'> 0 and l'< 0, the slope of the LM cun e is positive.
The BB curve describes the combinations of r and y in
which the balance of payments is in equilibrium. The
equilibrium condition in the balance of payments may
be written as
BB: t(m, y) + f(r) = 0 (5)
where
IS:y=c(y-t(y))+g+i(r) (I) [= thetradebalance
where 
m = the marginal propensity to import
c = private consumption f = capital flows tofrom the economy[ = taxation
g = goven0ment expenditure Rewriting equation (5) in terms of the autonomous trade
i = investment balance (i.e. that part of trade independent of income)
we obtain
The slope of the IS curve is obtained by totally differen- t - m'y + f(r) (5a)
tiating equation (1) holding g constant so thar
dy 
= c'. (dy - t'dy) +i'dr (2) As t-my = 0 in equilibrium, the slope of the BB curve is
Rearranging we obtain given by f'dr. The sign of f 'dr will depend upon condi-
tions in the domestic capital market. If there is perfect
&ldy 
= 
(l - c'(l-t'))/i' (2a) mobility of capital f'dr = infinity and the BB curve will
As 1-c'(1-t') 0 and i'< 0 it follows that drldy is negative * l'::,Tt"l. If there is no capital mobility, f 'dr = zeroand the BB curve is vertical. The standard case lies
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between these extremes with the BB curve positively
sloped.
In Diagram A, the economy is in equilibrium at r' and y'
with the goods market and money market clearing and
balance of payments tt zero. A fiscal contraction implies
a shift leftwards in the IS curve to IS'as demand in the
product market declines. Activity is.reduced and real
domestic income falls from y" to y''. With domestic
income falling, the balance of payments moyes into an
initial surplus reflecting a fall in imports (via the m.y
term). However, the fall in money demand associated
with reduced economic activity eases the domestic inter-
est rate below the international level. The emergence of
a negative interest rate differential in the domestic econ-
omy induces a capital outflow and imposes downward
pr€ssure on the cxchange rate. As the economy is oper-
ating in a fixed exchange rate regime, the monetary
authorrties are oblrged to intervene to support thc domes-
tic currency. On the assumption of unchanged levels of
domestic credit, the loss of reserves implies a contrec-
tion in the domestic moncy supply followed by the return
of the domestic interest rate to parity with the interna-
tional rate. In the diagram, this is represented by a
leftward shift in the LM cutae to LM'and a further
decline in real income to a new eqrrilibrium level at y2,
The assumptions cf fixed exchange rates and capital
mobility are crucial to the ultimate impacts of a fiscal
contraction on income. If exchange rates ere flexible, the
effects of the fiscal contraction will be transient as nomi-
nal depreciation ofthe domestic currency boosts exports
and restores income to its original eqtrilibrium level. If
capital movements are fully restricted, the fiscal contrac-
tion will be conipensated by "etowding in" effects on
private sector investrnent,
(5)
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APPENDIX B
Derivation of condition for stabilisation of trajectory in public debt ratio in
(6)
(sa)
ratio in
(s)
(6a)
(6b)
where
! = nominal GDP
Q = the growth rate of nominal GDP
Rearranging (2) and expressing ratios to GDP in
letters we obtain
& I Ba Ft. / Brt
nb,= 
-f,+#.,or+fi.brr
so that
bs= 
-f1+tffl.ua
Equation (3a) may be rewritten as
b1= 
-f.+r(u7-:@S.a*1(1+s). (1+p")
In a small open economy, the interest rate parity theorem
implies that
(2)
(7)
(3)
(3a)
(4)
{= the international interest rate.
e = the expected appreciationy'depreciation
in the exchange rate
q = the risk premium on domestic interest
rate
We can now derive
1t+y'1 . (t+pd1=(l+r') . (t+pn). (l+e) . (l+4) ea)
so that
(t+/'1=(1+/). |ry. (t+e)]. (l+q) (7b)(t+p')where
dr=
a discrete time Feriod t in a smai! open economy with capital rnobllrty"
The general government budget constraint may be ex-
pressed in terms of the dynamic evolution of the public
debt ratio as
. 
Bt-Bpt= 
-F'.r.t''6pt (ti
where
f, = the nominal value of the public debt
F = the primary balance (i.e. total receipts
minus total expenditure excluding debt
servicing costs)
id= the implicit interest rate on the debt
This representation of the budget constrarnt abstracts
from the possitrility of monetary financing of the debt
(i.e. the holding of government debt by the moneaary
authorities). If monetary financing is to be included, the
term - l.M/Y should be added to the right-hand side of
equation (1). This term represents seigniorage, where I
is the rate of growth in base money and MfY is the
seigniorage tax base. However, as this nature of mon-
etary financing is not a significant feature of budgetary
policy in Ireland, this term is omitted for purposes of
simplification.
Expressing (1) in terms of GDP we obtain
period t and t-1.
From equation (6) we obtain
f =rffir .brt-brr
so that
f =rffi'u,-,
(r +l)=1t + r'). (1 +a). (1 +c)
small where
g = the growth rate of real GDP
pd = the domestic inflation rate
so that
bt= 
-ft+tffil ta
For stabilisation of the trajectory in the debt
period t, it is necessary that
b1- be4=!
Adjusting equation (4a) we obtain
bt 
- 
b-.t=o = --f,'+t{l#l bpt- b-.r
where
f* is the "stabilising primary balance" i.e. the primary
balance consistent with an unchanged debt ratio between
the real implicit interest rate on the debt
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If long-term purchasing power parity holds then
/1r-x\
r\Y-L /iu\r 
- 
II 
- 
(rril-!
i t*o'' t
Jibstirut,r': rn eauario,! (/Dt we outalr,
iL+f1=(i+l') (rrs)
so ihat
(7c)
,d = qt+r\. (1+c) - 1
lf we now substitrrte eguation (7e) into eouation (6b) we
)Dtain
;**1?t1):.!jl-qi -(i'z); ar-, /8,, . il+.q)
Rearranging equati.on (B) we obtain
,id.)
(8b)
3; 1+r lr crJse !<r 1 we can gssrlrle tnat q.1i+r '" rp-
proxlmaies q.
Finally, equation (8b) can be written to provide the
primary balance f required to stabiiise the debt ratio as
/=rfuffir,a,-,
f =tflffi.un, (8c)
Tirusn d5lnarnic stabiiity ln the Cebt ratio in riris small
1)Den egrnorny model with capitai ncobilitv is rlete.rmine<i
by tne rnrernational tnterest rate, economic gtowth and
the risk premium on the domestic interest rate.
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Chapter 2
Unemployment and
the lrish Labour Dlarket
0. Introduction.
For Ireland, a persistently high unemployment rate is one
of the principel macroeconomic legacies of the last de-
cade. The unemployment ratelof 17% remains almost
twice the Community averaBe. despite four successive
years of accelerated economic growth since 1987. This
annex examines how the deterioration in lreland's unem-
ployment trend in the first half of the 1980s was particu-
lady severe and how the unemployment response to the
subsequent recovery in the economy has been weak
when adjusted for emigration. The nature of the unem-
ployment problem now facing heland is then briefly
discussed with reference to some theoretical consider-
ations. In particular, the possibility that persistently high
unemployment may have shifted the natural rate close to
the actual rate is examined. By applying some standard
and more recent theoretical concepts to the hish case,
some possible factors explaining the emergence and per-
sistence of such e high unemployment rate are presented.
Finally, a number of conclusions are drawn as the basis
for an improved policy response to the problem.
1. A costly disinflation 19E1.t6.
In line with internstional trends, the hish economy dis-
inflated in the first half of the 1980s. The hish exoeri-
ence w8s notable for its above rverage duration2 and cost
in terms of reduccd output and employment growth.
Between 1981 and 1986, real GDP increased by an aver-
age of less than 2% per annum end employment growth
largely stagnated - actually declining in some years (See
Graph 2.1).
The sectoral distribution of employment performance
was not uniform over the period (see Table 1). A secular
decline in agricultural employment and a sharp reduc-
tion in manufacturing and construction employment was
partly offset by steady, if not spectacular, growth in
services. Although rationalisation was greater in the
male labour force than in the female labour force (see
Graph 2.2a), unemployment amongst women has in-
creased more rapidly than amongst men (see Graph 2.2b)
reflecting a progressive rise in female participation rates
(see Graph 2.2c).
A consequence of the weak employment performance in
this period was a near doubling of the unemployment
rate which rose from l0% in 1981 to 18,1% in 1987. A
comparison of the evolution of Ireland's unemploymcnt
rate relative to that in other Community member states
is provided in Graph 2.3. While the growth in unemploy-
ment in Ireland reflected structural adjustments in the
economy, the rationalisation of the labour force was
undoubtedly accelerated by the disinflation process. The
unemployment rate in Ireland post-disinflation in 1986
was exceeded only in Spain (20,4%).
2. Slow labour market response to economic
recovery 1987.90
After 1986, lreland enjoyed a sharp acceleration in econ-
omic growth, averaging 4,84o pet annum over the next
four years. lYhile the recovery was initially export-led,
internal demand has since emerged as the main source of
growth in the economy. This phasing of the recovcry
between the external (relatively capital intensive) and
the internal sectors of the economy may psrtly explsin
an extended lag in the response of employment to output
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France. Among German apprentices more than 9OVo ob'
tain a professional qualification and 8O7o are recruited
by their "host" firms at the end of their three-year train-
ing period. Less than 509o of the French apprentices
obtain a final qualification (CAR "certificat d'aPtitude
professsionnelle") and an insignificant number are re-
cruited by the firm where they made their apprentice-
ship.
A significant influence of education on labour produc-
tivity is also evident. The average productivity of a
worker who left school before the age of 15 is half that
of a worker who stayed in the education system until the
age of 22 to ?t4 years. Apparent labour productivity is
systematically increased as enterprises employ more en-
gineers and qualified technicians and less non-qualified
personnel.
All in all, the general level of education in France is far
from being satisfactory. Full-time education is compul-
sory until the age of 16. If the rate of participation in
education at the age of 17 is equivalent to those of other
EC countries, it decreases rapidly among higher age
groups. At the age of 19, only 437o ofFrench youths are
still in the education system as compared lo 574o in
Germany, 54Vo it the Netherlands,53/o in Denmark and
494o in the UK.
A serious problem lies in the interface between schools
and enterprises. The transition from the education sys-
tem to the labour market is made more difficult because
a vast majority of youth leaving school have no real
direct experience of a working environment. Ages of
reciprocal misunderstanding or ignorance between the
educative and economic worlds need to be overcome
culturally in order to approach the "dual" system suc-
cessfully developed in Germany. Nevertheless, improve-
Grrph 3l: Shere of vocetional trelnlng ln secondery school
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ments have been observed in the past few years. For
example, new types of vocational training implying
compulsory periods in firms ("baccalaurdats profession-
nels") have been created.
The orientation of the French education system is quite
"elitist". There are significant barriers to entry into dif-
ferent channels of education. In the second level (aged
between 10 and 18 years), the general education system
is distinct from vocational training and mobility of pu-
pils from one to another tends to be from general educa-
tion to vocational training. In the third level, the
"Grandes Ecoles" which recruit most of their students
between the age of 18 and 22 nd benefit from the
highest expenditure-per-student ratios form a channel
completely separated from the remaining universities.
This polarisation at the different levels of the system is
reinforced by the long-standing Paris-provinces polari-
sation,
The general picture is supported by comparative statis-
tics. The proportion of any given generation entering
university is comparable to that of other EC countries:
33Vo as compared to 267o in Germany, 33% in the uK,
357o in the Netherlands or 37Vo in Denmark. The propor-
tion obtaining a A-year degree and higher qualification
is even higher than in all other countries, probably be-
cause third level education in the public sector is free.
The education system is clearly providing the French
economy with a sufficient number of highly qualified
workers, for whom the probability of unemployment is
very low.
4.6 Labour market policies
Most Community Member States have been reluctant to
adopt active employment policies' Except for public
sector wages, intervention in the wage settlement pro-
cess is minor and is confined to moral suasion. In France,
however, the minimum wage regulation is controlled by
the Government.
Labour market policy can be divided into active policy
and passive policy. Passive poticy might consist ofearly
retirement schemes: thus artificially reducing the num-
ber of unemployed. Active labour market policies aim at
reducing vocational weaknesses, increasing the mobility
of workers, and reducing the insider-outsider problem.
Graph 32 compares the level of unemployment with the
expenditures of active labour market progranrmes per
unemployed person. Although the success of individual
labour market programmes cannot be proved and the
unemployment rates depend on a variety of important
factors, the graph suSSests that countries with active
labour market progralnmes and a corresponding design
of their social security system experience lower unem-
ployment rates.
Among the Community countries, France shows a fairly
inactive attitude. A closer link between social security
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benefits, which are provided fairly easily, and labour
market programmes appears advisable,
Labour market programmes should mainly be devoted to
the following three areas. Firstly, they should aim at
improving the vocational training of young people'
Given the abrupt transition from school to work life,
young people fail to adjust to the new challenges. There-
fore, labour market Programmes should aim aI improv-
ing the professional quality of school leavers and also to
provide greater flexibility between professions. Second-
ly, labour market Prograrnmes should increase the pro-
fessional flexibility of unemployed people in order to
prepare them for new jobs, This would reduce unemploy-
ment in sectors where employment is on a structurally-
declining trend. Thirdly, the importance of labour
market prograrnmes for reducing insider-outsider prob-
lems should not be underestimated. Participants in such
prograrnmes get much more information about their own
professional prospects, realistic income levels and the
necessity to becoms more flexible. [n order to strengthen
the links between labour market programmes and the
labour market such programmes should be designed in
close contact with the trade unions and the enterprise
sector.
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4. Possible determinants of Irish
unemployment.
4a. Structural aspects
Demography : Natural increase, labour
f orce participation and migration.
Labour supply is a function of the natural rate of increase
in the potential labour force (i.e. the 15-64 age cohort in
the population), the activity rate and net migration. As
indicated in Table 3, the potential rate ofnatural increase
in the Irish labour force is high, reflecting traditionally
high (but now falling) fertility rates and a period of
significant immigration in the mid-1970s. This resulted
in a population 'bubble" with more th an 509o of the total
population below 25 years of age in 1985. As this
"bubble" enters the labour market, the rate of natural
increase will remain elevated and supply pressure will
remain high. Population estimates (based on a zero emi-
gration assumption) indicate that the "bubble" will not
have passed fully until 2006. (See Table 3)10. The actitL
ity rate in keland is not significantly below the Com-
munity average, but female participation rates are
relatively low. Labour Force Survey evidence suggests
that female participation rates are indeed rising in line
with improved education opportunities for women and
the rising trend in atypical employment e.g. part-time
work (See Graph 2.2b). Migrtion is a particular char-
acteristic of the hish labour market reflecting economic
and cultural links with the IIK and US. The direction of
migratory flows varies with the relative performance of
these economies and the domestic economy. Outflows
during the domestic economic depression in the 1950s,
gave way to substantial reverse flows in the 1970s but
re-emerged in the course of heland's disinllation in the
1980s. Emigration has thus acted as an equilibrating
mechanism regulating supply pressure on the kish la-
bour markettl.
With a high natural rate of increase in the labour force,
a rising activity rate and variable migration flows, demo-
graphic influences on the kish unemployment rate might
be expected to be significant. Model-based analysis" of
developments in the Irish labour market casts new light
on this issue. The analysis indicates that over the ex-
tended period l97O-87 demographic factors accounted
for about one third of the increase in the unemployment
rate but over the more confined period of accelerating
unemployment 1979-86, the net effect of demographic
factors on the increase in the unemployment rate was
quite small (less than one tenth). This reflects substantial
net outflows of population after 1984 offsetting eerlier
inflows. Thus, while variable demographic pressures
have clearly been significant in the contert of keland's
long-term unemployment performance, it would seem
that they did not significantly contribute to heland's
rising and persistently hrgh unemployment rate in the
1980s.
Teblc 3: Estlmilcd Lebour Forcc Flors bv Ace Grouos 19t6 to 2005. essumlnc nll net mlpretlon ln ell crtecorler
Age
t5-24
25-34
354
45-&
65+
Total
1986187 1989/90 r992t93 1995D6 t998t99 200U02 ?j0/,N5
55.8
-10.7
-2.1
-10.3
-10.0
22.6
59.0
-11.3
-2,2
-10.3
-9.7
25.5
58.3
-12.0
-L3
-10.5
-9.4
u.t
58.3
-12.9
-L4
-11.0
-9.3
22.6
58.9
-r3.8
-2.5
-1t.7
-9.2
2t.8
54.6
-14.1
-L7
-r2.5
-9.4
16.0
49.5
-14.2
-L9
-13.5
-9.5
9.4
Sorrce: NESC Report No. 90'Thc Economic end Socid Implications of Emigration" (March l99l)
10 See NESC Report No. 90: "The Economic and Social Implications of Emigration" (March 1990).
I 1 Other economic aspects of emigration such as the "hain drain" effect and interference with real wage adjutrnent (i.e. by
easing downwad pesure) ue also relevant to the determination of the domestic unemployment raE.
12 See Bany F, and Bradley L: "lrish Employment and Unemployment - A Macro*onomic Analysis" Reprt h he NESC
(1990),
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Changes in the productive system.
In the mid-70s, the long-term vulnerability of traditional
manufacturing activity in heland encouraged the adop-
tion of a new industrial strategy based on attracting
mobile foreign inveshent. The underlying rationale has
been to increase output and employment in the economy
by importing capital with a high degree of embodied
technology; by progressive linkage of foreign based in-
dustry to the domestic economy, it is hoped to ultimately
create a strong indigenous industrial base. Inward invest-
ment is attracted using capital grants and fiscal incen-
tives.
There has been considerable success in attracting inward
investment to Ireland and productivity in manufacturing
has ri sen sharply I 3. lvnite lorei gn-based enterprises n o w
employ about 40% of the manufacturing labour force,
the returns in terms of linkage to the domestic economy
and hence total employment creation in the economy
have been below original expectations. Much of the
problem lies in the type of inward investment attracted
as:
i) inward investment has been concentrated in capi-
tal- intensive activities providing insufficient em-
ployment creation to replace losses in the declining
traditional and labour-intensive industries; thus,
the modern industries have provided an increasing
share of a declining stock of manufacturing em-
ployment.
ii) capital grants and favourable tax treatment of cor-
poration profits (i.e. a lOTo taxrate on profits from
manufacturing activity and a facility for full repa-
triation without additional taxation) have attracted
transnational operations characterised by vertical
integration and frequently engaged in transfer pric-
ing. For these operations, Iinkage to the domestic
economy is not considered a priority; moreover,
the high level of profit repatriation inevitably as-
sociated with this type of investment reduces the
level of "retained" value-added from these indus-
tries and so dilutes any demand impact on employ-
ment elsewhere in the economy.
4b. Cycllcal aspects.
As the acceleration in kish unemployment in the first
half of the 1980s coincided with a protracted period of
weak growth in the economy, it might be reasonably
expected that demand deficiency may have been an im-
portant determinant. As a small open economy (in the
process of a simultaneous disinflation and fiscal consoli-
dation), Ireland's growth performance in the 1980s has
been highly dependent on conditions in the international
environment. A recent econometric analysis of Irish un-
employment performance has attempted to isolate the
impact of cyclical movements in the world economy on
Irish unemploymentla. The external influence is as-
sumed to be channelled through trends in world output,
the rate of unemployment in the UK (as the main desti-
nation of outward migration from heland), international
interest rates, world profitability and world prices. The
period under analysis extends from 1970 to 1987 and
movements in the relevant extemal variables relating to
cyclical influences are abstrdcted by assuming a hypo-
thetical trend equal to actual trend over the earlier period
1960-70.
The isolated impact of external influencesl5 on the evol-
ution of the Irish economy was to reduce the end-period
unemployment rate by 6,5 points relative to the histori-
cal outturn. Negative external impacts were found to be
greatest in the first half of the 1980s when the Irish
unemployment rate accelerated. A significant aspect of
this "cyclically adjusted" outcome is that the unemploy-
ment reduction (mainly in the second half of ther 1980s)
coincides with higher emigration as the hypothetical
employment conditions assumed for the UK are consid-
erably more favourable than the historical outturn. This
"pull" effect of conditions in the UK economy on lrish
migration flows presents the hish labour market as hav-
ing the characteristics of a regional segment of the larger
UK Iabour market. This view is further reinforced by the
fact that Irish unemployment is rising rapidly during
199 1, as the UK economy experiences recession. In these
circumstances, the level of involuntary unemployment
in Ireland is clearly influenced by demand conditions in
the UK labour market; this would support the thesis that
13 Sustained growth rates above 107o in productivity in the kish manufacturing sector have raised doubts about the reliability of
productivity measurement The existenoe of transfa pricing is suspected as a source of uprvard distortion in ttre productivity
figures.
Barry and Bradley op cit
The Barry and Bradley shrdy also frnds public policy and demography as having had a significant effect on kish
unemploymentrates.
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the emigration adjusted unemployment rate in Ireland in
1989 (when labour demand in the UK was very high) was
indeed close to the natural rate.
4c. Supply.sldeaspects.
The tax wedge, social transf ers
and the replacement ratio
While the overall tax burden on the Irish economy is not
excessive by Community standards, the incidence of
taxation is uneven with substantial porti.o-ns of the poten-
tial tax base exempt. A narrow tax baseto has given rise
to very high marginal rates and low thresholds within the
taxation system, as fiscal pressure rose in the first half
of the 1980s. The main burden of taxation is now borne
by labour income (including social security about447o
of total tax receipts in 1990) and consumer expenditure
(about 45% of total receipts in 1990)", reflected in the
emergence of a very substantial "tax wedge" between the
gross wage (gross cost of labour) and the net wage (net
of tax remuneration of labour). The scale of the tax
wedge implies a significant additional cost of labour to
Greph 2.4: Gross rnd nct w.ger l9tl . Et
employers. The most striking feature of the emerging tax
wedge in the 1980s (See Graph 2.4) has been that it has
not only affected the respective level but also the irends
in the gross and net wage. [n real terms, the average net
wage fell steadily over the period 1981-86, while the
average gross wage increased. The clear implication is
that upward pressure on wages in this period of rising
unemployment has derived more from the fiscal system
than from the labour market. Thus, while the disinflation
process after 1981 required wage moderation to avert
unemployment, the fiscal system was exerting upward
pressure on labour costs. In this way, public policy is
likely to have had a major impact on trends in unemploy-
ment by impeding adjustment in the real wagelt- The
widening tax wedge will have been a twofold source of
unemployment, acting as a powerful disincentive to both
labour demand and supply, and would explain the rather
moderate employment creation performance of labour-
intcnsive service sectors of the economy during the
1980s.
While taxation of labour income rose over the 1980s, the
political philosophy of successive administrations has
been to protect the real value of per capita current trans-
Greph 2.5: Per ceplte tmnsfers vs consumptlon wrge rnd
lmpllclt trend ln rephcemcnt retlo
1981 . 88
e50
t00
lc0
16
17
The narrowness of the tax base is not solely attributable to the favouable treatment of the enterprise sector. The tax base is
also narrowed by the absence of taxation on many fixed assets (e.g. only limited residential property tax) and a substantial
number of zero-rated items in ttre VAT system.
e.g. in 19E7, the marginal income tax rute of 56Vo was applicable to an unmarried emptoyee earning just below 987o of.the
average indutrial wage while expendihre tax rates were second only to those of Denmark and substantially above the
Community average,
This implication is verified by the Barry and Bradley study which concludes that the procyclical fiscal policies of the late
197G resulting in the extended correction in the first half of the 1980s conributed about 4,7 points to the unemployment rate
in theperiod 1980/87.
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fers. In Graph 2.5, the estimated growth in per capita real
current transfer payments to the unemployed as a proxy
for trends in overall social transfers is indicated. As
current transfers arenot subject to direct taxation and net
wages were falling more rapidly over the period, a rise
in replacement ratios is implied (see also Graph 2.5).
Empirical research supports this finding and suggests
that the rise in overall replacement ratios (inclusive of
benefits not specifically related to unemployment)
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s was quite substan-
tial- fiom 46% to 587o between 1978 and tigsle. Wnite
there is little theoretical consensus on the unemployment
effects of rising replacement ratios through disincentive
to work, there are specific instances where the interac-
tion of the social welfare and taxation systems have
given rise to identifiable'poverty traps".
Lqbour law, trade union powers and the
wage formation process.
A major focus of more recent unemployment theories has
been the effect of institutional rigidities in the labour
market. This approach concentrates on factors which
may shift the balance of power in the wage bargaining
process and/or reduce the influence exerted by the un-
employed on the wage formation process. ThreO main
sources of rigidity may be identified in this respect:
0 Worker protection legislation may act as a disin-
centive to employment, particularly inasmuch as it
limits flexibility in labour supply (e.g. via restric-
tions on "hiring and firing") and hinders adjust-
ments in real wages (e.g. via a statutory minimum
wage). The hish labour market is not excessively
regulated relrtive to other Community member
states and survey evidence20 indicates that this
factor is not ranked hiShfi as an impediment to
employment by employers"'. keland does not have
a statutory minimum wage. Minimum wage levels
are established in some specific sectors but these
are not uniforrr, being related to the demand and
productivity conditions applying in each sector.
Thus, the scope for reducing unemployment
though labour market deregulation would appear
somewhat limited in lreland.
ii) The relative strength of the trade unions and em-
ployers in determining wage rates and other condi-
tions in the labour market may be another
determinant of unemployment levels. Contempor-
ary analysis comparing unemployment and wage
formation under different collective bargaining
regimes suggests that the prospects for unemploy-
ment are worst when the regime falls between the
two extremes of highly centralised wage negotia-
tions and fully decentralised (i.e. at firm level)
negotiationsz'. This was the situation in heland
between 1981 and 1986. Trade union influence in
Ireland reached its apex in the late 1970s and early
1980s when management of the economy was
based on a highly centralised arrangement and the
social consensus encompassed a wide range of
economic and social policies. However, the dis-
mantling of the centralised wage bargaining sys-
tem in l98l (and subsequentrationalisation ofthe
labour force in the disinflation period to 1985)
greatly reduced the role of the trade union move-
ment in the management of the economy but indi-
vidual unions continued to exert influence wilhin
specific sectors of the labour market.
The change in economic regime in 1987 has meant
a return to "corporatist" strategies. The two me-
dium-term economic and social progr"mm"t23
have been based on a consensus incorporating gov-
ernment, employers, farmers and trade unions. A
key element of both of these programmes has been
a wage agreement, Iimiting per capita wage growth
close to the rate of inflation and including restric-
tions on industrial action. The wage limitations
have been adhered to since 1987 (facilitated by
increases in real disposable income through low
inflation and reductions in payroll taxes) and the
number of strikes fell sharply. Once again, wage
bargaining is highly centralised; however, the suc-
cess of this more recent experiment in social con-
sensus is largely attributable to a mutual
recognition of the severe difficulties facing the
economy in the mid-1980s. It is interesting, how-
ever, that wage consensus is required in an econ-
omy with an unemployment rate above 16?o.
iii) The "insider-outsider" model has attracted atten-
tion as a further supply-side source of unemploy-
ment and is closely linked to the notion of trade
union power. In this case, members of the labour
force (insiders) are assumed to set the conditions
for employment in the wider labour market on the
basis of self-interest. Their ability to do so will be
a function of their relative power vis-a-vis em-
ployers. The employers, however, may reinforce
19
20
21
22
See Hughes J.G. and Walsh B.M.: "Urrmployment Duration, Aggregate Demand and Unemployment Insurance" (198a) and
Nolan B. "More on Actual versus Hlpothetical Replacement Ratios in Ireland" Economic and Social Review (198E).
Undertaken by the Department of Labour 1986.
Indee4 there may be some validity in the counter-argument that the existence of formal structures to resolve employer
employee disputes promotes rather than discourages employment creation.
See Calmfors L. and Dritrill J. : "Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performarrce". Economic Policy
No.6 1988.
The Programme for National Recovery 1987-90 and the Programme for Economic and Social Progress l9l-93.2,
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the dominant position of the insiders through a
reluctance to replace existing employees with new
but unproven candidates. In this way, the unem-
ployed (outsiders) are impeded from entering the
labour market even when willing to do so at a wage
rate below the market rate. This model is particu-
larly relevant to labour markets where segmenta-
tion between highly skilled (insider) and low
skilled (outsider) workers is pronounced. In this
case, the insiders can use their comparative advant-
age to maximise their share of profits so long as the
integration of the low-skilled into the labour mar-
ket can be prevented. In Ireland, analysis of the
unemployed suggests that the proportion of the
long-term unemployed falling into the category of
unskilled workers has been rising steadily in the
1980s; this would be consistent with the predic-
tions of the insider-outsider model.
Labour market mismatch, vocational
training and education.
As structural shifts in an economy will alter the pattern
of employment demand there may be a resultant mis-
match of labour supply and demand. In heland's case,
the effects of a belated integration into the world econ-
omy (after fifteen years of protectionism post World War
II) reinforced by a strategy of accelerated industrial
development via high rates of inward investment have
resulted in a pronounced structural shift in the economy.
As many of the traditional sectors of the economy have
been replaced by more modern sectors, the level and
pattern of labour demand has clearly changed. Structural
adjustment in heland was concentrated in the 1981-1986
period and coincided with the sharp acceleration in un-
employment so that the possibility of mismatch as a
source of persistent unemployment exists.
The conventional response to mismatch in the labour
market is vocational training. This can either be preven-
tative (e.g. "in house" training provided primarily within
the private sector and designed to prevent redundancy)
or corrective (e.g. State sponsored training for the unem-
ployed). There is little published information available
on "in house" training in Ireland, but the level of State
training has clearly increased in line with the trend in
unemployment. Much of this increase has been funded
by a progressively larger contribution from the Com-
munity's Social Fund. Expenditure increases mirror a
steady rise in throughput and the latest statistics indicate
a throughput of about 100 000 participants in training
courses (of variable duration) per year in Ireland.
The bulk of State trainees receive general training al-
though a small number are trained by skill-specific agen-
cies (e.g. lrish Management Institute, CERT). A wide
range of training options is provided (increasingly tech-
nology-based) but a formal relationship between train-
ing provision and the profile of anticipated labour
demand in the economy is not clear. Little analysis has
been undertaken in this area while a similar paucity of
follow-up research on the labour market experience of
trainees prevents en ex post assessment of the effective-
ness of training measures. A more analytical appraisal
of training provision is necessary to ensure the effective-
ness of this type of labour market intervention. If train-
ing is ineffective, then intervention reduces to an
extension of the social welfare system; in consequence,
the massive investment in human capital implied by the
level of training expenditure in Ireland would not be
reflected in a proportionate reduction in unemployment.
The general education system is also an important deter-
minant of employment and hence unemployment condi-
tions in the economy. Relative to other Community
member states (many more developed) per capita public
expenditure on education in heland compares favour-
ably. The existence of a well-educated and flexible
young labour force is frequently cited as one ofkeland's
principal attractions as a location for foreign investment.
However, the large proportion of the population in edu-
cation imposes a heavy burden on the public finances.
As emigration has risen in recent years the financing of
education has come under increasingly critical scrutiny.
Hysteresis.
The concept of hysteresis implies that unemployment in
any given period is at least partly determined by unem-
ployment in previous periods. If the unemployment rate
moves from equilibrium in response to a shock, factors
may come into play which hinder a return to the previous
equilibrium. Such factors would include the supply-side
impediments discussed above, which might eventually
lead to a depreciation in human capital (through skills
loss) and discouragement in job search. The longer the
actual unemployment rate remains away from the earlier
equilibrium, the more likely it is that the new rate will
become a new equilibrium. In this way, the NAIRU (or
natural rate) gravitates towards a new equilibrium
around the actual rate. Thus, if actual unemployment is
high and rising over time then the natural rate is also
likely to rise over time. The existence of hysteresis casts
doubt on the extreme neo-classical postulation that the
actual unemployment rate will ultimately gravitate to-
wards a clearly defined natural rate and suggests the
existence of persistent involuntary unemployment. Hys-
teresis would be consistent with the observed concentra-
tion of Irish unemployment in the marginal (i.e. older
and low-skilled cohorts of the labour force) and the
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progressive lengthening in the average duration of un-
employment throughout the 1980s (proportion of long-
term unemployed in total up from32% of total in L979
to 46% in 198D24.
5. Conclusions.
The acceleration in the unemployment rate in the first
half of the last decade was the result of the interaction
of sbuctural shifts in the economy, weak external and
internal demand and increasing supply pressures in the
domestic labour market. The emergence of emigration
after 198314 seems to have largely neutralised demo-
graphic pressures on the unemployment rate in this peri-
od; however, the population structure and the sensitivity
of emigration flows to recovery in the domestic economy
present a latent threat of surging supply pressure in the
labour market. There is also much evidence to suggest
that the accelerated rise in unemployment and its persist-
ence at high rates in the 1980s has led to a hysteresis,
with the natural rate moving close to the actual rate.
Demographic pressures on the labour market cannot be
addressed in the context of short-term policies. Popula-
tion estimates suggest that the natural rate of increase in
the labour force will fall dramatically in the early years
of the next century. However, in the short term, employ-
ment will be required to grow by between ZVo a;nd2,57o
per annum in the absence of net emigration simply to
restrain the unemployment rate to its current position;
Neither the level of economic growth required to provide
such employment growth nor the reduction in the real
wage rate necessary to clear the labour market at more
normal growth rates seem likely. Undoubtedly, conti-
nued outward migration would ease supply pressure on
the labour market but historical variability in the level
and direction of migration flows suggest that such
beneficial impacts cannot be assumed a priori. On this
basis, heland's unemployment problem is clearly not
capable of a'quick fix' solution; any expectation that
the hish economy can simply grow its way out of its
unemployment problem seems implausible.
It is imperative that whatever impediments which cur-
rently exist to the maximisation of employment creation
from growth in the economy should be removed. In this
respect a number of targets for adjustment can be ident-
ified:
i) the reduction of the substantial tax wedge which
hasraised the costs of employment creation despite
downward pressure on net-of-tax wages from sup-
ply conditions in the labour market. One of the
central features ofrecent fiscal strategy has been a
reduction in taxation of labour incomes, while ex-
penditure taxes have also been reduced in line with
the requirements of the internal market. In conse-
quence, the tax wedge has narrowed somewhat
since 1988 (see Graph 2.4\.The narrowing trend in
the tax wedge is set to continue but will be largely
constrained by the need for continued fiscal re-
straint. The scale ofdifferential between gross and
net wages will undoubtedly remain a source of
unemployment in the medium term.
while the existing corporatist approach to wage
negotiating has proven successful thus far, flexi-
bility in the wage formation process is still desir-
able to ensure that productivity differentials are
adequately reflected in wage rates. Otherwise, rig-
idity in wage formation may result in spill-over
from more productive to less productive sectors. A
remarkable feature of the recent centralised wage
agreements is that the upper limit on wages has
been observed in sectors enjoying significant pro-
ductivity gains2s. Much of this success may have
been attributable to the severe economic circum-
stances and to increases in real disposable incomes
facilitated by low inflation and income tax cuts. In
less difficult economic circumstances, relating
wage claims to productivity performance claims
may become more the norm. The limitations of the
present arrangements in this regard have already
been recognised in the Programme for Economic
and Social Progress l99l-93 where a facility for a
limited supplemental wage increase related to Pro-
ductivity is included.
The attraction of foreign capital is an important
means by which a less-developed economy may
enhance productivity and hence provide for sus-
tainable growth; given keland's relative labour
costs, competition for highly labour-intensive in-
vestment is unrealistic. As much of the inward
investment will, therefore, be in capital intensive
production a large payback in terms of employment
creation cannot be expected. However, the use of
capital incentives to attract mobile investment
tends to distort factor prices in the domestic econ-
omy, thereby reducing whatever employment
might be forthcoming from this type of industrial
strategy if it were operated on a more neutral basis.
In addition, measures to encourage maximum link-
age between foreign-based production and the do-
mestic economy will help to retain the maximum
level of value-added from these activities and so
boost employment creation elsewhere in the econ-
omy.
ii)
iii)
Localised concentsation of unemployment (e.g. in particular urban areas or rural villages where two and in some instances
three generations of unemployed workers may be living) is a particular feature of the Irish economy; such concentration can
give rise to a pervasive "unemployment culture" in these areas.
Some of this discipline may be explained $l increased a@ess Eo personal contracts between employees and employers.
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vi)iv) while a global freezing of transfer payments in
conditions of substantial structural unemployment
may be difficult to justify, continued targering of
transfers would seem an appropriate measure to
minimise disincentive effects of the social welfare
system. Meanwhile, examination of the interface
between the welfare system and the taxation sys-
tem to avoid the occurrence of poverty traps is
clearly desirable. Some adjustments to the duration
of higher rates of benefit payment might also be
considered.
a more quality-oriented approach to the provision
of vocational training seems essential better to
address the existence of skills mismatch in the
labour market. This is even more important as the
level of Community assistance to lrish investment
in human capital increases. A more analytical ap-
proach to the provision of training in the context
of anticipated labour market requirements is re-
quired. A greater private sector involvement in the
forrnulation (and financing) of training initiatives
might also help to improve the relevance of the
training provided and link it more closely to the
likely profile of demand in the economy.
promotion of new work patterns (i.e. contract em-
ployment, part-time employment, profit-sharing
arrangements) will help to improve flexibility in
the labour force and hence the employment re-
sponse to economic growth. In this respect, there
is a short-term risk that increased provision of
atypical employment will be more reflected in in-
creased participation rates than in lower unemploy-
ment. However, in the longer term the increase in
potential output associated with these measures
should provide the basis for a sustained improve-
ment in overall employment and unemployment
performance.
finally, a more positive aspect of the hysteresis
phenomenon is that it occurs in both directions.
Just as rising unemployment can pull the natural
rate upwards, a sustained fall in unemployment can
correspondingly create a downward momentum in
the natural rate. This thesis underlies recent propo-
sals for State intervention to specifically promote
the reintegration of the long-term unemployed into
the labour market.
v)
vii)
* This chapter was mainly prepared ry S. Berrigan of the National Economies Directorate
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Chapter 3
The Catching-up Process
in freland
0. Introduction.
As Economic and Monetary Union approaches, attention
has increasingly focused on the risks to economic and
social cohesion posed by continuing disparities in nomi-
nal and real economic performance among member
states. The main sources of nominal divergence can be
found in differing inflation rates, external balances and
public finance ratios. Consideration of real divergence
has so far concentrated on differences in economic de-
velopment, with the Community broadly divided into the
more developed EURS (Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United
Kingdom) and the less developed EUR4 (Greece, Spain,
heland and Portugal). This division is based on measure-
ment of relative per capita GDP (adjusted for differences
in purchasing power), with all members of EUR4 below
75% of the Community average. Real convergence im-
plies a narrowing of the gap in per capita GDP between
EUR4 and EUR8 in what is termed the 'catching-up"
process.
As heland currently enjoys an inflation rate below the
Community average, a surplus on external account and
a convergent trend in its public finances, nominal sta-
bility has been largely realised. This annex will, there-
fore, concentrate on real convergence issues in
examining the hish catching-up process; however, the
interaction of nominal and real convergence in Ireland's
past performance and future prospects for catching up
will be highlighted. The first section examines the Com-
munity's interpretation of catching up and how this de-
finition reflects an underlying philosophy on the nature
of the economic and monetary union @MU) to be cre-
ated. The kish catching-up perforrrance over the period
1960-90 is then reviewed. Looking forward, the pros-
pects for a sustained catching up in heland are examined
in the context of potential constraints imposed by EMU.
In the final sections, some specific implications for lre-
land's catching-up process arising from the existing
economic development strategy are considered.
1. The catching.up process.
Articles 130(a) and 130(b) of the Treaty commit the
Community to the strengthening of economic and social
cohesion. Cohesion is to be secured particularly by (i)
narrowing disparities between the various regions and(ii) reducing the backwardness of the least-favoured
regions. In the formulation of economic policy at both
Community and national level, cohesion aspects are to
be considered. More direct Community support is to be
provided via the Structural Funds (see Appendix A).
Relevant to the concept of cohesion are the two related
concepts of nominal and real convergence. The former
concerns the need for greater coherence among the vari-
ous national monetary and fiscal policies in advance of
an operational EMU; the latter concerns the desirability
of a more balanced regional distribution of benefits (and
losses) accruing from increased economic and monetary
integration.
In broad terms, nominal convergence requires the ap-
proximation of inflation rates, public finance balances
and (to a lesser extent) external balances to sustainable
levels throughout the Community. In this way, potential
sources of tension between member state economies
operating within a fixed exchange rate regime will be
diminished. The requirements for real convergence are
less clear-cut. To date, the Commission has concentrated
on trends in per capita GDPI at member state level as an
operational measurement of real converg.ence in the
Community. With per capita GDP as a basis', a succcss-
ful real convergence in the Community implies I process
in which average output in the lagging member states is
brought considerably closer to the that of the more-de-
veloped member states. This process is described as
catchin8 up.
The choice of per capita GDP as the basis for measuring
the catching-up process reflects a philosophy on the
nature of the EMU to be created. By regarding output per
capita as a proxy for average welfare, the Community
has interpreted a successful catching-up within EMU as
a balanced regional distribution of production capacity,
in conditions of nominal stability. The underlying ration-
ale is that convergent levels of per capita output will
ensure that all regions of the Community have ultimately
the economic base from which to independently generate
sufficient income to maintain high living standards.
Community assistance to physical and human capital
investment in the least favoured regions (via the various
Community Support Frameworks) is clearly consistent
with this philosophy.
1
2
adjusted for purchasing power parities
The limitations of aggregate oonstructs such as per capita GDP in measuring aveiage economic performanoe are well
documented (e.g. exclusion of non-market transactions, assumptions that market prices reflect social value and failure !o
cap[re disEibutional aspects). Nevertheless, such indicaors remain a useful tool of analysis at the macroeconomic level.
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In the Community's concept of catching up, trend growth
in average labour productivity (i.e. equivalent to output
per member of the employed Iabour force in national
accounting terms) must remain higher in the less-de-
veloped member states than in the more-developed mem-
ber states over an extended period. In standard
neo-classical theory, inequalities in factor productivity
are not sustainable as equilibrating flows of capital to
and labour from the less-developed regions brings labour
productivity into line with that of the more developed
regions'. The implication is that the catching-up process
will occur automatically. However, the fact that the level
of labour productivity itself has remained persistently
lower in certain regions of the Community implies the
existence of impediments to the equilibrating flow of
production factors. These factors may relate to scale
economies, technological endowment, locational disad-
vantages etc. The catching-up process might thus be seen
in terms of success in removing impediments to the free
flow of production factors.
As the single market comes into operation restrictions
on labour flows within the Community will be eased. [f
capital does not flow from the more-developed to the
less-developed regions, the burden of adjustment in the
catching-up process will be borne by labour migration
which may ultimately result in an inefficient population
distribution throughout the Community. To fostercapital
accumulation in the less-developed member states, the
conditions for investment must be optimised. The Com-
munity has an important role to play in directly suppor-
ting investment in infrastructure and human capital;
deficiencies in these areas frequently act as impediments
to investment and reduce efficiency in the economy.
However, the dominant factor in promoting catching uI
is the domestic policy framework i.e. an appropriate
macroeconomic policy mix to provide greater certainty
for investment decisions and microeconomic/structural
reform to boost overall economic efficiency. Impedi-
ments to the free flow of labour should also be removed.
2. Ireland's catching-up performance 1960-90.
Real convergence among the present members of the
Community was strongest in the 1960s, when the catch-
ing-up process in EUR4 relative to EUR8 accelerated
(see Graph 3.1). However, the greater severity in the
effects of the two oil shocks in the weaker economies
and a generalised sub-potential performance in the world
economy throughout most of the 1970s and early 1980s
stalled the catching-up process. As the world economy
recovered after 1985, the catching-up process resumed.
The apparently positive correlation between catching-up
performance and overall growth in the Community sug-
gests a strong "cyclical" aspect to progress in real con-
vergence measured in terms of per capita GDP.
Within EUR4, catching-up performance has not been
uniform (see Graph 3.2). Unlike the other members,
Ireland has experienced a rather static trend in per capita
GDP relative to the Community average since 1960.
Four phases of Irish catching up are identifiable:
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3 A catching up in levels of labour productivity will not be mirrored in an exact equatisation of per capita GDP betrveen
member states drrc to likely differences in dependency ratios.
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Phase l: 1960-77.
In the period 1960-77, developments in the Irish econ-
omy were influenced by a new policy framework of rapid
industrialisation and abolition of trade barriers. As the
integration of the economy into world trade progressed,
the investment/GDP ratio increased from L4,4?o to
U,8% (see Graph 3.3) while the weight of foreign trade
(imports plus exports of goods and services) in GDProse
fuom 69,1% to 107,94o. Despite the favourable trend in
world trade and policies aimed at improving potential
output and efficiency in the economy, Ireland made vir-
tually no progress in catching up. This relatively poor
performance contrasts sharply with the remainder of
EUR4 where very substantial improvements in relative
per capita GDP were observeda.
keland's static performance in this earlier period can be
largely attributed to the influence of the UK economy.
Vlhile the Irish economy was opening, economic perfor-
mance was very much influenced by a formal currency
link with sterling and the heavy weight of the UK in
keland's burgeoning foreign trade. In these circumstan-
ces, it is not surprising that hish economic performance
should have been adversely 
_affected by the long-run
weakness of the IIK economyt. It should be noted, how-
ever, that this episode of stagnation in heland's real
convergence relative to the Community as a whole coin-
cided with a substantial convergence relative to the UK
(see Graph 3.4). In the wake of the 1973 oil shock,
stabilisation policies operated to support the level ofper
capita GDP in keland relative to the rest of the Com-
munity. However, rs in the other members of EUR4, no
progress was made in catching up.
Phase 2: l97t-81
After 1978, Ireland entered a short and unsustainable
period of accelerated catching up; per capita GDP rose
by about 3 points relative to the Community average
over the succeeding 
-four years, despite a rapid rate of
growth in population6. The accelerated catching up coin-
cided with a rise of 5 points in the investmenUGDPratio
peaking * 30,5% in 1979 (see Graph 3.3). However, this
calching up was not spontaneous but was "engineered"
through the pursuit of a markedly procyclical fiscal pol-
icy'. The increase in investment did not simply reflect a
private sector response to fundamentals in the economy
but also reflected a sharp increase in public sector bor-
rowing. As investment was heavily concentrated in so-
cial areas (hospitals, schools etc.), the improvement in
supply potential in the economy was not proportionate
to the increase in investment. The simultaneous fiscal
stimulus to consumer demand (via transfers to house-
Greph 3.3: Investment/GDP mtlo ln Irelend
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Greece +14 points, Spain +18 points and Portugal +14 points.
In the period 1960-73, per capitaGDP in the UK declined by almost 20 points relative to the Community average.
In the 19(h, immigration from the UK to heland raised the average rate of increase in population to about 1,57o per almum.
This experiment in demand management was an attempt to "pump-prime" the economy so as to force GDP onto a higher
modium-term growth path. In theory the use of fiscal policy to boost medium-term economic performance was not
unjustified. In the oontext of monetary union with the UK, the expansion in demand would initially result in a widenhg
extemal deficit but financing of tlre deficit was assured by a fixed exchange rate with sterling and the free movement of
capital from the UK. Over time, a supply-side response from the domestic economy would restore external balance.
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holds and public sector employment) resulted in a supply
shortfall. The 1979 oil shock further constrained the
supply-side response and resulted in a widening aggre-
gate demand-supply gap and very quickly in severe
nominal instability.
Phasc 3: 19t2-t6
By end-1981, nominal conditions in the economy were
clearly unsustainable. Widening public deficits under-
pinned the already high levels of consumer price infla-
tion (19,6% in 1981) and were reflected in increasing
external disequilibria (current external deficit of L4,7Vo
of GDP in 1981). As the unsustainability of the expan-
sionary fiscal (and monetary) stance became apparent,
the authorities were forced to disinflate the economy
between 1982 and 1986. The result was a protracted
period of sub-potential growth in which the earlier im-
provement in investment performance was more than
reversed; the investmen{GDP ratio ended the period at
t8,2?o (see Graph 3.3), despite an rcceleration of inward
investment into exporting sectors. The deterioration in
investment reflected a reduction in public and private
construction activity and difficulties experienced in
traditional (and labour-intensive) manufacturing sectors
as the real exchange rate appreciated and payroll taxes
rose steadily. Thus, nominal instability effectively ap-
plied a brake to heland's catching-up effort in this period
and progress in real convergence was again stalled, al-
though the rest of the Community was also growing
relatively slowly.
Phase 4: 1987-1990
Between 1987 and 1990, Ireland has experienced a sec-
ond phase ofaccelerated catching up; per capita GDPhas
risen by about 4 points relative to the Community aver-
age. In contrast to the earlier phase ofrapid catching up,
this more recent phase has coincided with a sharp con-
solidation in the public finances (net borrowing down by
about 8% of GDP) implying a more spontaneous conver-
gence in economic growth performance. This more
sustainable catching up can be explained by three main
factors:
Firstly, the international environment since 1987 has
been particularly favourable. The reverse oil shock in
1986 and the subsequent resurgence in world trade re-
sulted in a massive expansion in hish export markets.
With disinflation largely achieved, the real appreciation
in the punt has stopped so that the trend in competitive-
ness has improved considerably. In consequence, the
extemal performance of the economy has improved,
particularly in the highly export-oriented modern sec-
tors, most of which did not exist before 1981, where
output volume has surged. (However, the scale of re-
covery in external performance has most likely been
exaggerated by transfer pricing activities within the
foreign-based sectors).
Secondly, the lessons of the failed experiment in fiscal
activism in the 1970s, combined with the discipline of
the ERM, have resulted in a macroeconomic policy mix
more consistent with the requirements of a small open
economy in international trade. Fiscal policy is geared
towards a greater equilibrium in the public finances and
anti-inflation credibility has been boosted by a monetary
policy geared toward exchange rate stability. The moder-
ate wage performance reflects an increased awareness of
international competitiveness constraints and has rein-
forced the downward trend in inflation. As the credibility
of the new policy mix has been established the favour-
able trends in the fundamentals of the economy have
been reinforced, fostering a recovery in private sector
investment.
Finally, a not insignificant contribution to the catching-
up performance as measured in terms of per capita GDP
has come from demographic sources. Having fallen
sharply from the mid-1970s, net emigration returned to
historically high levels after 1985; this has resulted in a
stagnation in population growth and a mechanical im-
provement in measured per capita GDP.
The role of the domestic policy framework in the more
recent period of sustainable catching up contrasts
sharply with that of the previous catching up in 1978-81.
The current macroeconomic policy mix has fostered a
high rate of return on investment through price stability
and high profitability despite a reduction in public sector
activity. In response to more favourable external and
internal conditions, the investment/GDP ratio has risen
slowly from below lTVo in 1987 to l8,25%o in 1990 (see
Graph 3.3). This growth has been almost exclusively
sponsored by the private sector, although the operation
of the Community Support Framework will ensure a
greater public sector contribution in coming years.
Coupled with the favourable external environment (es-
sential to an accelerated catching up in a small open
economy), the nominal stability provided by macroecon-
omic policies h.as allowed a sustainable catching up in
per capita GDP". As already noted, however, this catch-
ing-up performance must be adjusted somewhat for the
historically high labour outflows primarily to the UK.
I In 191, the short-term outlook for the catching up process has deteriorated. World rade has entered a phase of more
moderote growth and the recession in the US and UK has stifled outward migration resulting in a rise in 0re population for the
first time sfure 1985.
The Catching-up Process in Ireland 45
3. Prospects for catching up within EMU.
The recent success in Ireland's catching-up performance
suggests that the direction of heland's macroeconomic
policy framework, supplemented by further structu-
raUmicroeconomic reforms is appropriate for an accel-
erated catching up (if external conditions permit). On the
Community level, however, the question arises whether
EMU will foster or hinder progress in Ireland's catching
uP.
As stated in the report on EMU by the Commission
services'One market, one money" the key to a success-
ful catching up 'lies in obtaining synergies between
national and Community policies". Within EMU, mon-
etary policy will be centralised and will be geared to-
wards overall price stability. Fiscal policy will remain
the responsibility of national authorities; however, the
restoration of public finance equilibrium in Ireland will
remain a priority to reduce the vulnerability of the econ-
omy to external shocks. Completion of the intemal mar-
ket will impose increased competitiveness constraints on
the evolution of domestic costs (predominantly labour
costs in a small open economy) while exposing any
inefficiencies in the domestic productive system. In
these respects, EMU implies a reinforcement of the
existing macroeconomic policy regime in lreland rather
than any major alteration. As EMU acts to reinforce the
favourable domestic conditions for investment, capital
should flow from the more developed regions to lreland
promoting real convergence. Meanwhile, the use of the
Community's structural funds as an element of the inte-
gration process will help to underpin the catching up in
keland by further easing infrastructural and human capi-
tal constraints on the level and efficiency of investment.
3a. Posslble constralnts lmplled by economlc
unlon.
The benign view of the synergy between EMU require-
ments and heland's independent catching-up efforts is
not uncontested. The principal reservations expressed
have related to economic union (completion of the inter-
nal market). Emphasis has been laid on arguments from
the "divergence school" which point to the centripetal
effects of scale economies, industrial structures, trans-
port costs, locational disadvantages (peripherality) and
imperfectly competitive market structures as potential
economic impediments to keland's catching up within
EMU. Such impediments to investment flows from the
more to less-developed regions could lock the hish econ-
omy into a permanent state of underdevelopment.
In the NESC Report on Ireland in the European Com-
munityg, the prospects for hish economic performance
as integration continues were examined in considerable
detail. The report points to the significant threats posed
to lrish industry by the completion of the single market.
For manufacturing industry, it is concluded that the posi-
tive direct effects of the single market (related to cost
and price reductions) are likely to be outweighed by
negative indirect effects (related to absence of scale
economies, technological innovation); however, the net
effect on each industry will depend upon specific factors
which characterise its operations. Community integra-
tion poses a greater threat to the service industries,
which in contrast to the manufacturing sector, remain
largely sheltered from international competition; many
of these service industries may now face the same
"weeding out" phenomenon as occurred in manufactur-
ing in the years following accession. Arationalisation of
the services sector would have serious implications for
employment performance in the economy. Again, the net
effect will depend upon the specific characteristics ofthe
industry concerned but the risks in this sector are seen
as high.
Counter-arguments suggest that the net effect on the
Irish economy will be positive. Given the high level of
intra-industry trade (as opposed to inter-industry
trade)10 and the absence of scale advantages in the main
growth sectors of its manufacturing base, the Irish econ-
omy would seem well placed to benefit from the aboli-
tion of frontiers. Meanwhile, the proximity of the very
substantial UK market would suggest that scale con-
straints on the traditional manufacturing sectors are not
so great as implied by the small size of the domestic
market. Locational and transport disadvantages related
to Ireland's peripherality will be eased by appropriate
investment in physical infrastructure with Community
assistance. While some service sectors will undoubtedly
suffer from increased international competition, others
(notably financial services, where competition already
exists and scale is less important) should benefit from a
single market. In this respect, it is possible that the Irish
economy will experience a "IJ-curve" experience with
9
10
NESC Report Irlo.EE: Ireland in the European Community: Performance, Prospects and Strategy. (August 1989).
Studies by tlre Commission have shown that lagging member states with a high degree of intra-industry rather that
inter-industry trade may be better positioned to compete within economic union. Economies relying on inter-industry trade
will be competing on progressively narowing wage differentials as catching up proceeds. Ireland, has a relatively high
conoentation of inta-industry trade reflecting the substantial foreign based component of the manufachring sector.
However, the size of this forcign-based sector poses risks of its own leaving the economy vulnerable to strategic decisions
taken outside of the national jurisdiction. See O'Malley E.: "Sectoral implications of the Single European Market for hish
Manufachring", European Ecornmy - Special edition 1990.
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integration implying an initial deterioration in relative
economic performance followed by a sharp recovery.
3b. Posslble constralnts lmplled by monetary
unlon.
With nominal stability achieved, movement to a system
of fixed exchange rates implies little cost for the hish
economy; as already indicated, rapid rates of catching
up have coincided with historically low rates of inflation
and an external current surplus". Thus, the risks of
monetary union per se to Ireland's catching up would
seem limited, if nominal stability is maintained. Never-
theless, keland's earlier experience (1978-81) of rapid
catching up intermpted by nominal difficulties suggests
the possibility of a dynamic interaction between nominal
and real convergence. If a rapid catching up in real
output is accompanied by a corresponding catching up
in prices, to what extent will a fixed exchange rate
regime lock the hish economy into a stop-go cycle of
rapid real growth, inflationary pressures, real appreci-
ation and slowdown?
Two potential sources of inflation within the context of
a rapid catching up in heland within EMU can be ident-
ified. Firstln inflationary pressure could emerge in re-
sponse to a wage spillover from the tradable to the
non-tradable sector. As average labour productivity
rises in keland (as demanded by the catching-up pro-
cess), a corresponding catching up in domestic wage
levels will inevitably occur. However, rs wages tend to
equalise between the relatively more productive (mainly
tradables) and less productive (qainly non-tradables)
sectors of the domestic economy", a positive average
inflation differential may emerge between Ireland and
the rest of the Community. Under a fixed exchange rate
regime, such inflationary pressures could not be
countered by a nominal appreciation to divert demand
from non-tradables to tradables by means of a relative
price adjustment. However, fixed exchange rates would
not necessarily imply a nominal constraint on the econ-
omy arising from the average inflation differential. So
long as wage growth in the tradables sector remains in
line with productivity, a positive averag€ inflation dif-
ferential related to a catching up in non-tradables prices
can be supported without a loss of external competitive-
nesslS.
Secondly, inflationary pressures might arise from a de-
mand-pull inflation associated with the phasing of catch-
ing up between aggregate demand and supply. In this
case, the risk is of an inflationary wage spillover from
the non-tradable to tradable sector, which would reduce
competitiveness in the (price-taking) tradable sector at
any given level of productivity and so reduce export
potential. Without access to nominal depreciation, I real
appreciation will constrain growth and so stall the catch-
ing-up process. Within EMU as is already the case with
the ERM, an independent monetary response to potential
demand pressures will be limited.
The important determinant of inflationary risks in an
accelerated catching up will be the size of the non-trad-
able sector. In an open economy where the non-tradables
sector is small, any catching up in demand ahead of
supply will be reflected in a temporary deterioration in
the external balance; within a fixed exchange rate
regime, this will not impose a major short-term con-
straint on the economy and will be corrected as supply
and demand move back into line over time. In the context
of EMU, with free trade in all goods and services and
free capital mobility, the weight of non-Eadables in all
Community economies is likely to be reduced in the
longer term. The hish economy is now among the most
open in the OECD so that the relative weight of non
tradables in GDP is already small; thus, the risk of severe
inflationary pressures arising from the non-tradables
sector in Ireland is low. However, as inflation implies
allocative inefficiency, a reduction in the size of the
non-tradable sector by opening the economy to the maxi-
mum degree possible would still be appropriate.
4. Catching up and the Irish development
strategy.
A particular characteristic of lreland's economic perfor-
mance in the 1980s has been the emergence of a pro-
gressively larger divergence between GDP and Ci!f,(see
Graph 3.5). This GDP/GNP gap reflects an increase in
net factor outflows, mainly comprising profit repatria-
tions and debt-servicing payments. The high level of
profit repatriations (net 6% of GDP in 1989) is a function
of an economic development strategy based on attracting
inward investment into highly profitable and export-
oriented sectors. These sectors are dominated by subsi-
diaries of transnational corporations in which operations
tend to be vertically integrated and transfer pricing is a
particular attraction. [n such circumstances, a high rate
of profit repatriation is to be expected. The debt-servic-
ing payments relate to the substantial stock of external
debt in the public sector, where a belated correction of
11
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This is in marked contrast to the erperienoe of other member states enjoying rapid growth in this period (UK, Porhrgal, Spain)
where nominal divergence has accompanied economic expansion.
This type of wage spillover is entirely consistent with the efficient operation of the economy as dernand for production factors
shifts betrreen sectors.
This analysis is empirically supportedby the experience of Japan and the United States in ttre 1980s when higherJapanese
productivity in tsadables frcilitated a positive average inflation differential with the US accompanied by an apprcoarion of tlre
yen (see also Bonlc of England Quarterly Bulletin May l99l).
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the procyclical fiscal policies in the 1970s has left a
heavy debt overhang. While the trajectory in the public
debt/GDP ratio is now downward and external debt
(about 37% of total debt) is being retired whenever
possible, debt-servicing outflows still constitute about
3% of GDP and will remain significant in the medium
term.
The scale of the differential between GDP and GNP
raises the question of the appropriateness of per capita
GDP as the measure of catching up in Ireland. The
strength of Ireland's productive capacity is clearly cap-
tured by the GDP measure but the capacity of the econ-
omy to independently support living standards is more
accurately reflected in the GNP measure. Thus, GNP per
capita is a more rccurate measure of the indepr.ndenl
catching-up process in keland. As indicated in Graph
3.6, the level of per capita GNP (and hence the implied
standard of living) is much lower than per capita GDP.
This is particularly the case for the 1980s, when the
weight of the foreign-based sectors in GDP became in-
creasingly important. Thus, Ireland's catching up as
measured by per capita GDP may be overstated.
Apart from inaccuracies in measuring catching-up per-
forurance, the divergence between GNP and GDP (relat-
ing to profit repatriations rather than external debt
servicing) points to a potentially more serious difficulty
in keland's development strategy. Direct inward invest-
ment has been the favoured means of modernising the
kish industrial base since the mid-1970s; inward invest-
ment is attractive because it facilitates a catching up, not
only by capital accumulation but also by improving the
efficiency of the capital stock via a high level of embo-
died technology. However, as most of these industries
are subsidiaries of larger parents, a high level of profit
repatriation is an inevitable feature of their operations in
Ireland. [n this way, much of the value-added (and hence
potential spillover employment effects elsewhere in the
economy) leaks from the domestic economy.
The scale of net profit repatriation from keland is an
important manifestation of the severe duality which re-
liance on inward investment has created in the economy.
The manufacturing base is split between capital-intens-
ive, highly productive, foreign-based sectors and rela-
tively labour-intensive, indigenous, Eaditional sectors.
The foreign sectors are highly export-oriented, mainly
towards the broader Community market, while the in-
digenous sectors remain predominantly oriented towards
the domestic and UK markets (although the weight of the
Community markets in their exports is rising). While the
foreign sectors provide a significant share of total em-
ployment (407o in manufacturing), in most other resPects
their linkage to the domestic economy is weak.
The emergence of a dual structure between the domestic
sectors and the foreign-based enclave reflects an implicit
"targeting" within industrial policy of more capital-in-
tensive production; investment is attracted using a
generous package of capital grant-aid and fiscal incen-
tives. While there is no evidence of formal discrimina-
tion between foreign and domestic investment, it is
likely that the relatively limited scale of capital invest-
.tt The Catching-up Process in Irebnd
ment affordable by domestic investors explains the
lower response to industrial incentives from indigenous
sources. In this way, inward investment is effectively
favoured over domestic sources within industrial policy.
A further consequence of the fiscal bias towards capital
is a distortion ofrelative factor prices; this distortion is
made-worse by a very heavy tax burden on labour in-
come'". The distortion of relative prices will not only
have reduced the employment response to economic
growth (by encouraging capital deepening) but will also
have penalised local entrepreneurship and so further
discriminated against indigenous investrnent activity.
Continuation of the existing industrial shategy is likely
to result in an increasing weight of foreign relative to
domestic investment in the economy. If linkage between
the two sectors cannot be improved, the divergence be-
tween GDP and GNP will widen. Moreover, as capital
intensity of production increases but profits continue to
leak from the economy there is a risk that the employ-
ment response to economic growth will be progressively
eroded. In such circumstances, higher rates of labour
migration to other parts of the Community over the next
decadels cannot beavoided. Catching up'in terms of per
capita GDP will be achieved at the expense of a static or
even declining resident population.
A more neutral treatment of capital and labour within
industrial/fiscal policy would help to provide a more
balanced development in the economy. By removing
factor price distortions and fostering an improved bal-
ance between domestic and foreign investment activity,
the gap between GDP and retained value-added might be
controlled and the employment response to growth en-
hanced. In more recent years, hish industrial policy has
moved in this direction with adjustments to the relative
fiscal treatment of production factors, reduced emphasis
on aid to fixed assets in favour of R&D and by attempts
to link inward investment incentives to use of domestic
supply.
The need for a reorientation of indushial strategy is
increased by the emergence of strong competition for
inward investment in other parts of the Community and
particularly Eastern Europe. The Irish authorities face an
important policy dilemma: an intensification of existing
strategy to maintain direct investment flows will further
distort the economy but a failure to respond to competi-
tion risks the loss of a major source of output and em-
ployment growth. Despite the obvious risks, it would
seem appropriate for the lrish authorities to avoid aggra-
vating existing distortions in the productive system. In-
stead, the focus of industrial policy should move to
alternative areas in which Ireland possesses a com-
parative advantage in terms of inward investment. In
this respect, Ireland's ability to compete on the basis of
a high return on investment via a favourable wage/pro-
ductivity relationship supported by high quality and
flexible labour force and physical infrastructure up to
Community standards is vital.
5. Catching up and fiscal transfers.
A possible means to achieve an accelerated catching up
in a less developed economy without population loss is
through substantial income support from more-de-
veloped regions. In "One market, one money", no con-
vincing arguments were found to support the need for an
income equalisation mechanism financed by fiscal trans-
fers within EMU. This type of mechanism is nonnally
employed to avoid major population shifts which might
impose negative externalities by the desertification of
some regions and the congestion of others. Thus, the use
of income support to interfere with labour mobility from
lagging regions is considered economically justified
when real convergence threatens spatial balance in the
distributi on of popul ati on. Unlike other federally-based
economies, the scale of potential labour mobility in the
Community is small (due to cultural and linguistic diver-
sity); thus, no major dislocation of population from the
Iess-developed regions is expected. The absence ofsuch
"inefficient" emigration reduces the need for direct in-
come transfers from the richer to the poorer regions of
the Community.
lreland is exceptional within the Community in that it
continues to experience high rates of intemational emi-
gration mainly to the UK. Although there are negative
economic and social aspects to Ireland's emigration, the
outflow of labour has acted as an important equilib'rating
mechanism by easing domestic labour supply pressures
while satisfying demand mainly in the UK. Migration
flows are highly sensitive to income levels in the Irish
economy; this was illustrated in the mid-l970s when an
improvement in Irish economic performance relative to
that of the UK induced a wave of retum migration. More
recently, analysis of the impact of the Community Sup-
port Framework 1989-93 on the lrish economy has found
that while Community assistance is expected to boost
GNP by 2,'7?o from the baseline level by the year 2000,
an associated slowdown in emigration is likely to reduce
the benefit to 0,87o in terms of per capita GNpt6.
l4 The low taxation of capital simply exacerbates the problems posed by an already narrow Irish tax base where exemptions are
wi&spread so that labour income bears UEo of tlg direct tax burden and more than 3O7o of. thetotal tax bur&n.
Supply pressure in the domestic labour market is expected to ease dramatically in the early years of the next century, due to a
recent decline in the birth rate.
See Bradley J. and Fitzgerald J. : "The macroeconomic impact of the Strucnaral Funds on the hish economy." - A shrdy
undertaken on behalf of DG)O(I (unpublished).
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The NESC reportlT argues for a model of EMU involving
a highly centralised policy function and sizable fiscal
transfers from a Community budget. This model is based
on existing income equalisation mechanisms in the
United States and Germany where income in poorer
regions is supplemented by perrranent transfers through
the federal taxation system. In such a model, the catch-
ing-up process would be measured in terms of disposable
income and could take place independently of an econ-
omy's capacity to produce. Per capita output (GDP or
GNP) relative to the Community average would no
longer be the appropriate index of catching up and a
more income-based index would be necessary.
In the previous section, a case was made for the use of
per capita GNP rather than GDP in measuring heland's
catching up in terms of output. However, just as GDP
fails to take account of net factor movements to and from
the economy, GNP does not include income transfers to
and from the economy. In a catching up process based
on convergence in the disposable income of economic
agents, per capita GNP would understate the level of
catching up in the hish economy. For Ireland, the appro-
priate basis for measuring a catching up in income would
be Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI). CNDI
adjusts GNP for net income support from abroad. Net
international transfers to the kish economy are strongly
positive (2-3% of GDP) and largely comprise Com-
munity assistance to the economy. GNDI is therefore an
ex post measure of income in Ireland i.e. after support
from the CommunitylE (see Graph 3.7).
If the justification for fiscal transfers is to be the stemm-
ing of migration flows by supporting disposable income
in the economy, the use of per capita GNDI as an appro-
priate index of catching-up performance is called into
guestion. The sensitivity of Irish migration flows to
improvements in domestic economic conditions points
to a trade-off between improvements in the lcyel of total
gross disposable income and catching up measured in Dgr.
f,ipilt terms. As the reside{rl population grows in re-
sponse to increased income", the improvement in the
level of GNDI provided by fiscal transfers would not be
reflected in a proportionate increase in per capita
GNDI2o. The pace of convergence in per capita income
would thus be conditioned by the (desired) rate of growth
in resident population. In these circumstances, the catch-
Greph 3.7: Per caplta GDP, GNP end GNDI ln Irclend
1960.1990
ing-up process would be more accurately represented in
terms of the ability of the kish economy to suPPort I
higher resident population at a given level of per capita
income.
The use of fiscal transfers to stem population shifts is
not without risks. While a high resident population is
likely to induce positive growth effects through Sreater
scale economies in the domestic market, the disincentive
aspects of public transfers from the centre to heland
must also be considered. The provision of income sup-
port without a sound macroeconomic and microecon-
omic basis could actually retard the catching-uP Process.
If income support seryes to encourage the least produc-
tive workers not to emigrate, while having less impact
on emigration among higher skilled cohorts of the labour
market, backwardness in the economy may become cu-
mulative, trapping Ireland in a less-developed, depend-
ency status.
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An interesting feahre of the kish economy is the switchover which took place in the 1980s when per capita GDP (average
product) began to exceed per capita GNDI (average disposable income). This phenomenon is particular to heland and is not
reflected in other members of EIJR4 wlrere in all cases per capita GNDI remains above (to varying degrees) per capita GNP
and GDP (see Fig E)
Given the scale of emigration from the economy since the mid-1980s, there is potential for significant reverse migration into
the hish economy if irrcome levels were to rise.
The effect on catching up in the lagging regions would tend to be negatively affected by disincentive effects associated with
depelrdence on large-scale transfers.
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6. Conclusions.
The Community is committed to the promotion of econ-
omic and social cohesion by reducing disparities in per-
formance nmotrg regions and helping the less-developed
regions to catch up. To date, the Community has em-
ployed the trend in per capita GDP at member state level
as an operational measure of the catching-up perfor-
mance of member states. The use of GDP as a proxy for
econornic welfare reflects an underlying philosophy that
each member state should have an adequate economic
base to independently support (Community) average liv-
ing standards.
Economic theory suggests that catching up should occur
automatically through equilibrating flows of labour and
capital. The fact that some countries have persistently
lagged behind suggests the existence of impediments to
factor flows. The catching-up process can be seen as the
removal of such impediments. While capital accumula-
tion in less-developed member states will be helped by
Community support to infrastructural and human capital
investment, the crucial determinant remains the domes-
tic policy framework in reducing investment uncertainty
and promoting productive efficiency.
The role of domestic policy in the catching-up process
is evident from keland's catching-up performance. In
the late 1970s, a short period of accelerated catching up
based on expansionary fiscal and monetary policies
proved unsustainable as nominal conditions in the econ-
omy deteriorated. The real effects of the subseguent
disinflation reversed all earlier gains. In more recent
years, however, an appropriate macroeconomic policy
mix has facilitated a sustainable catching up in Ireland
while maintaining nominal stability.
As EMU approaches, the external context for keland's
catching- up effort will change. In economic terms, the
net effect on Irish performance will be determined by the
relative weight of convergent and divergent forces with-
in the single market. In monetary terms, Ireland's past
achievements in nominal convergence have greatly re-
duced any adjustment costs related to a fixed exchange
rate regime. The degree of openness in the Irish economy
is likely to limit the dsk of future nominal divergence
associated with an accelerated catching up.
Of more significance to heland's catching-up process
are the implications of a development strategy based on
attracting inward investment. The catching-up process
has been substantially overstated as profit repatriations
(and also extemal debt servicing) associated with inward
investment have led to a widening divergence between
GDP and GNP in the economy. More importantly, how-
ever, the targeting of mobile foreign investment has
effectively discriminated against domestic capital and
labour, creating a dual economy. Continuation of the
existing policy will increase the weight of foreign in-
vestment in total and further reduce the employment
response to economic growth. In this way, catching up
in terms of per capita GDP will increasingly overstate
the true position of the Irish economy relative to the
Community average and catching up will in part be
achieved at the expense of a lower employment-creating
potential.
Fiscal transfers from the more-developed to the less
developed regions of the Community provide a means
by which labour migration from lreland might be
stemmed while maintaining per capita income levels. In
this context, the appropriate measure of catching up
would be the level of Gross National Disposable Income;
as the objective of the fiscal transfers would be to sup-
port the resident population, it would no longer be ap-
propriate to measure catching up in per capita terms. In
effect, the pace of convergence in per capita income
would be balanced against a desired growth in resident
population.
*This chapter was mainly prepard ry S. Berrigan of the National Economies Directorate.
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Appendix A
THE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FRAMEWORK FOR IRELAND
With per capita GDP below 75% of the EURl2 average,Ireland was classified as an Objective I region in the
reform of the Comnunity's strucNral funds. The Community Support Framework (CSF) for Ireland is, therefore,
primarily aimed at promoting a sustainable catching up in terms of per capita GDP. The CSF is based on the
medium-term National Development Plan 1989-93 which provides a macroeconomic and structural policy frame-
work for improvements in potential output and employment performance in the economy. Community assistance
under the CSf wiU total ECU 3 672 million (2-3% of annual GDP over the five year period) implying a substantial
annual increase over the 1988 base-year level (about l,S%o of GDP). The increase in the programmed national
public contribution will be more moderate, reflecting the need for continued fiscal restraint in the medium terrr.
An annual breakdown of programmed Community assistance together with national public and private contribu-
tions to the CSF is provided in Table A.
The CSF coyers a total of ECV 6125 million of public expenditure, to be supplemented in certain areas by private
sector investment. Four specific priorities have been identified:
i) Agriculture, fisheries, forestry, tourism and rural development: investment is to be concentrated in arees
where keland is perceived to enjoy s comparative advantage, notably with respect to natural resources and
a clean environment;
ii) Industry and services: investment is to be concentrated in the exporting sectors with special emphasis on
promoting R&D and marketing activities;
iii) Measures to offset the effects of peripherality: investment is to be mainly concentrated in upgrading the
national road network;
iv) Human resources measures: investment to be concentrated on measures to ensure an appropriate match
between labour supply and demand in a developing economy.
Model-based analysis of the impact of the CSF on the kish economy indicates a net increase of.2,7?o from baseline
GNP by the year 2000. The corresponding impact in terms of baseline per capita GNP is a net increase of only
0,8%. This reflects a slowdown in net emigration in response to the creation of 30 000 jobs (about 21o of lhe
existing level of employment). The supply side impact is favourable implying an improvement in public finance
balances, the public debt ratio, unemployment rates and emigration, while demand-led inflation rates are transient.
TABLE A: ANNUAL BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURE UNDER THE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FN,AMEWOR.K FOB
IR.ELAND YN9I93.
year Total expenditure Community assistance National public National private
contribution contribution
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1989193
ECU 1571m
ECIJ 1422m
ECU 1578m
ECLJ 1785m
ECIJ fr44m
ECLI6126m
39%
47%
464o
44Vo
43?o
444o
33Vo
3l7o
3O9o
28%
22%
U:%
28%
3t%
n%
284o
269o
29?o
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Chapter 4
Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy
in Ireland
1. Instruments of monetary policy and
liquidity ratios
In the mid 1980s, management of monetary policy in
Ireland underwent s substantial change, the most import-
ant element of which was a shift from credit rationing to
the use of market-oriented instruments.
Credit controls came into operation in 1978. Until 1981,
these controls related to Irish pound lending by banks,
with a view to limiting the extenral deficit and to increas-
ing official reseryes. From 1981 onwards, the controls
applied to total lending (inclusive of foreign currency
lending) to the private sector; the conbols were enforced
up to 1984 by direct methods, primarily calls by the
Central Bank for supplementary deposits.
Controls were progressively phased out and ultimately
abandoned by the end of 1985; the Central Bank had
been relying on indirect methods of money management
since early 1984. The main instrument currently em-
ployed by the Central Bank is the rate of interest on the
STF (Short-Term Facility) which provides licensed
banks' with very short-term loans secured by govern-
ment paper and admissible bank bills. Commercial banks
use the STF rather than excess reserves to smooth out
fluctuations in their liquidity positions.
Foreign currency swaps and repos (sale and repurchase
agreements) provide liquidity for periods of one to two
weeks. The latter were introduced in 1983 as an addi-
tional tool of liquidity management but developed rapid-
ly and accounted for 13% of Cenhal Bank liabilities in
1990 compared to 57o in 1986. The Central Bank also
accepts term deposits from banks at specified interest
rates. Open-market operations are not available to the
Central Bank as its portfolio of government securities is
small.
Complementary to the above instruments is the banks'
reserve requirement, in the form of a liquidity ratio
referred to as the primary ratio (as opposed to the sec-
ondary ratio which is mentioned below). The primary
liquidity ratio applies to domestic branches of licensed
banks; besides deposits with the Central Bank, it in-
cludes the balance of the deposit protection account and
the banks' holdings of notes and coin, thus limiting the
need for discretionary balances. The ratio is calculated
on the relevant resources ofbanks i.e., essentially, non-
bank residents' dep osits, domestic interbank fu nding and
the net extemal liability.
The primary liquidity ratio was 10% but recently has
been reduced to 8?o. As a rule, the ratio is reduced by
one to two points in the period December to January each
year to support liquidity by offsetting the effect on the
money multiplier of the seasonal rise in the currency
ratio. Although this action is not strictly necessary, it is
useful as it attenuates the seasonal increase in interest
rates and the resulting capital movements.
Required reserves in Ireland are remunerated, so that the
burden on banks is lessened. However, the rate paid is
lower than in the market (by 10 to 20%) so that seignor-
age revenue (measured on the basis of interest-rate dis-
crepancy) in Ireland was, until recently, comparable to
Germany and slightly higher than France and Belgium.
Thus, in a situation of complete freedom of capital move-
ments, Ireland may face a problem of dislocation similar
to that in other Community countries. Further adjust-
ment in the primary liquidity ratio may be necessary
raising the question of whether a certain degree of har-
monization of reserve requirements at Community level
may be necessary.
In addition to the primary ratio, banks are subject to a
secondary liquidity ratio in the form of compulsory hold-
ings of government paper. The ratio is 25% of relevant
resources for Associated banks and l37o to 15% for
Non-Associated banks. This facility was useful in the
past as it provided a secure source ofgovernment financ-
ing at times when deficits were high. Now, its usefulness
is less obvious. Although it is remunerated at market
rates and, in consequence, does not have a fundamental
impact on banks'competitiveness, the existence of this
secondary ratio tends to complicate monetary aggre-
gates"; in addition, it limits the productive role of the
banking system, implying a misallocation of resources.
As countries compete more and more through their sup-
ply-side performance, the elimination of such a distor-
tion may need to be seriously considered. In any event,
such a facility is not likely to be acceptable in the next
stage of EMU. However, the elimination of this facility
could require some caution so as to avoid unfavourable
effects stemming from an abrupt tiquidation of the large
portfolio of government paper held by the banks.
Licensed banks, comprising the Associated (the clearing banls) and the Non-Associated (mainly merchant and industrial
banl6)' together with 0re Cenbal Bank form the banking system in Ireland. Other monetary intermediaries mainly include the
Post Office Savings Bants, other savings banls, the state-sponsored financial institutions and the building societies which are
accounting for an increasing proportion of total deposits in recent years.
It is recorded as bank credit to Govemment and is classified by the Central Bank as monetary financing of the public de6cit.
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2. Conduct and stance of monetary policy
2.1 Thc hard currcncy optlon
Exchange-rate stability has been an important compo-
nent of monetary and general economic policy in he-
land. As in all Community member states, it has been
used to achieve disinflation of the hish economy and to
provide the necessary stability for sustainable growth
and employmenl
At the end of 1978, when the UK Government chose not
to pailicipate in the ERM, the lrish Government decided
to join and imposed exchange controls on capital move-
ments to and from the IrK. Ireland had only limited
monetary policy options within the currency union with
the UK, so monetary independence was not an issue.
However, terminating (in March 1979) the 153 year-old
link with sterling meant not only that Ireland had to
establish an independcnt monetary and financial system
but also that it was abandoning a monetary union with a
country with which it had very close commercial, demo-
graphic, financial and cultural ties. Nevertheless, with
disinflation a primary target of economic policy, a con-
tinued link with sterling outside of the ERM was con-
sidered inappropriate.
Commitment to exchange rate discipline within the ERM
was expected to bring benefits in terms of a disinflation
bonus. The underlying rationale was a version of the
purchasing power parity theory. The traditional
(relative) version of PPP suggests that the nominal ex-
change rate will adjust to offset inflation differentials;
by fixing the exchangerate it was expected that increases
in prices and costs in keland would have to adjust to
those of the dominant trading partners. heland's experi-
ence of inflation under the sterling link in the 1970s
seemed to support these views; so it was hoped that low
(essentially German) inflation would feed into Irish
prices. It was acknowledged, however, that disinflation
could not rapidly pass through to costs and that compe-
titiveness would accordingly decline in the short term.
2.2 The achlevemcnt of stablllzatlon
The basic objective of the chosen monetary and ex-
change-rate policy was undoubtedly achieved: disinfla-
tion was largely completed by mid-l986 when the annual
rate of increase in consumer prices was down to 3.17o
from 19.6% ten years earlier. This achievement has been
maintained; in 1990, the deflator of private consump-
tion was 2.69o, comparable with that of Germany and
lower than the ERM average (see Graph 4.1).
Exchange-rate discipline fed into the economy though
a competitiveness constraint, necessitating a process of
real adjustment. Domestic demand was weak throughout
the early 1980s and, although unemployment rose
sharpln real wages did not decline. However, the sPpar-
ent strong upturn in recorded labour productivity caused
a significant slowdown in unit labour costs and a large
redistribution of income towards profits. Over the de-
cade as a whole, the adjustment of labour costs was faster
in Ireland than in other member states (see Table 1).
Inflation in Ireland and in the ERM nar-
row-band countries
2.3 Credibility and exchange-rate
competitiveness
Ireland's experience of the ERM proved to be even more
difficult than originally expected. One of the basic rea-
sons was that the exchange-rate commitment in itself
was not sufficient to ensure the credibility required to
secure a painless disinflation. The absence ofsupporting
macroeconomic policies, especially in the area of the
public finances, resulted in a considerable erosion of
credibility.
Equally important in terms of credibility, was the finan-
cial market assessment of Ireland's monetary separation
from the UK. There is some evidence suggesting that,
after 1979, German price changes influenced the pricing
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behaviour of hish firms more than in thc past and more
than the trade weight would suggestr; indeed, hish
prices now seem to be equally influenced by Geruran and
UK prices. After 1979, the IJK was no longer the exclu-
sive influence on the determination of interest rates and
monetary policy in keland. However, the influence of
UK ntes remains predominant. Although the share of the
UK in Irish trade was reduced in the period after 1978,
it still represents more than one third of Ireland's exports
and more than half of its imports. Thus, movements in
sterling and cycles in the lrK economy have sometimes
created slsfuange-rate tensions as the finaucial markets
have speculated on possible realignmsnts of the punt
within the ERM in response to competitiveness press-
ures.
InitiaUy, heland's ERM commitment was not a burden;
sterling appreciated sharply, improving heland's compe-
titiveness in its major market, while Germany was ex-
periencing a period of current account deficits, relatively
large budget deficits and relatively high inflation. How-
ever, by the same token, these developments initially did
little to restrain Irish inflation. Interest-rate differentials
began to widen in 1981 (see Graph 4.2).
Subsequently, Ireland's failure to cope with internal
problems, compounded by sterling's retreat from its
1981 peak and the progress in fiscal consolidation and
disinflation in Germann made exchange rate discipline
considerably more burdensome. In the March 1983 rea-
lignment, the hish pound was devalued. Differentials
increased substantially, reaching a maximum of ten
points against the DM in 1981-82 and again in 1985-36.
This latter period was critical for the Irish economy as
external and internal circumstance compounded to cre-
ate large scale speculation against the Irish pound. In
1985-86, both the US dollar and sterling depreciated
strongly while the Irish public debt/deficit problem came
sharply into market focus. As a result, strong expecta-
tions of a realignment caused large capital outflows and
official reseryes declined.
Yield curves reflected this situation. As the Govemment
underlined its determination to avoid a devaluation by
increasing official intcrest rates, the short end of the
yield curve rose from September 1985 to December
1985. By February 1986, shortrates moved even higher
but rates at the long end actually fell under the additional
expectation of slack growth in economic activity in an-
ticipation of fiscal correction. In March, the entire yield
curve shifted downwards while maintaining its inverted
shape; subsequently its normal shape was restored as
money market rates fell sharply when the Government
avoided Irish pound devaluation in the April 1986 EMS
realignmenL
However, the decision to abstain from realignment re-
sulted in a further severe loss of competitiveness. Ster-
ling continued to depreciate in the second qurrter of
1986 and this drove the real exchange rate to a peak even
higher than in the beginning of 1982. The Government
sought and obtained a unilateral realignment in the be-
ginning of August 1986. The negative credibility effects
of devaluation reinforced by the ovemrn in the budgeted
level ofExchequer borrowing produced upwrrd pressure
on domestic interest rates; thus, although short rates had
reached a low level of.9?o tt the end of the second qurrter
of 1986, the deterioration of market sentiment resulted
in a new increase in interest rates and in differentials
against the DM which climbed, by the end of 198?, to
13.9% and to 8.259o respectively (see Graph 4.2).
The yield curve again shifted upward in September and
further in December 1986. However, when a string of
credible budgetary measures wcre taken in l9t7 and
sterling became significantly stronger, it was possible
for the Irish authorities to underline their commitment
to the ERM by maintaining the Irish pound's rate in the
January 1987 realignment. Thus, by March 1982, long
rates had fallen; by June, the short end of the yield curve
3 T. Callan and J. Fitzgerald, '?rice Determination in lreland Effeats of Changes in Exchange Rates urd ER Regimes", t[gFrnnnmic rnd -Qmirl Pruiao l.nn6n, lOaO
Monetary and Exchange-rate Folhy in Irelsnd 55
also shifted down and thereafter the curve resumed its
normal shape.
A significant event in the period since 1987 has been the
decoupling of Irish interest rates from UK rates. Since
mid-1987, there has been a negative interest-rate dif-
ferential between the Irish and lJK rates, largely the
result of a favourable inflation differential.
Since the end of 1986, the Irish authorities have been
able to support the exchange rete more effectively, so
that the Irish pound has been displaying a remarkable
stability vis-l-vis the DM. The successful public finance
edjustment, redicelly increasing the credibility of he-
land's EMS commitment, meant that interest-rate dif-
ferentials vis I vis the DM have fallen to low levels and
are now at about 100 basis points.
However, the external environment has not been favour-
able throughout the period. In 1989, the strengthening of
the DM pulled up the narrow-band against third curren-
cies, sterling and the US dollar among others, giving rise
to expectations of a realignment. The substantial weight
of sterling in Irish trade again created problems for the
Irish pound; short rates were raiscd, and differentials
against the DM and the FF increased in order to counter
losses in reserves.
It is noteworthy that, in this period, it was meinly short
rates which increased; this points to the credibility that
hish monetary policy has gained. By September 1989,
the yield curve wos inverted as the short end moved
upward and thereafter the whole curve moved up in line
with international developments. It was not before the
second quarter of 1990 that the yield curve flattened as
a result of the decline in short rates.
* This chapter was mainly prepared by Y. Xenakis of the Directorate for Monetary matters.
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Chapter 5
Developments and fssues
in lrish Financial Markets
0. Introduction
In keland, the financial system has seen a number of
major changes since the currency link with the UK was
broken early in 1979 and Ireland participated in the
exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. The changes in
the financial environment accompanying the break with
sterling led to a rapid development in domestic financial
markets, a trend that had already begun in the 1920s as
the Irish economy opened up to Europe.
Participation in the ERM led to an increased role for the
Central Bank of Ireland in the implementation of mon-
etary policy geared to exchange rate stability. As a
counterpart to ERM participation, sterling area exchange
conhols were replaced by comprehensive kish exchange
controls covering all transactions outside the State. At
the time, it was difficult to assess the potential scale of
capital movements which could take place and hamper
the Central Bank's task in managing the exchange rate
since data on sterling asset holdings of Irish residents
were incomplete. Thus, to some extent, these controls
were precautionary at the time. Once in place they
proved difficult to remove. Progressive liberalization in
the scope ofthe controls tookplace in the late 1980s but
they still remain on a limited number of short-terrn
transactions. They are scheduled to be abolished com-
pletely by the end of 1992, stemming from keland's
obligations under Directive 88/36I/EEC.
Allied to these intemal developments in heland have
been the broader changes taking place worldwide such
as the rapid growth in international trade and multina-
tionals, technological change in banking, creation of
new financial instruments and shifts in sectoral financial
balances. The Iiberalization of regulatory controls in
major countries has also had significant knock-on ef-
fects. These developments have led to a number of inno-
vations in Irish financial markets over the past few years.
l. Structure of Irish financial market
The share of services of credit and insurance institutions
in gross value added in heland in 1987 was 67o compared
to an ECTI average of 7,8Vo. However the figuie for
Ireland is comparable to that of other smaller European
economies furnishing data at market prices (i.e. Belgium
5,8%, Netherlands 5,77o, and Portugal S,B%). The share
of money and other liquid assets held in various institu-
tions and its development over time is shown in Table l.
Profitability in banking is at the upper end of the Com-
munity scale when measured by the rate of return on
assets but less satisfactory in terms of the gross rate of
return on equity (see Table 2).
Up to the late 1960s, the so called "essoci$ed" banks
dominated lrish commercial banking. The name was
conferred on these banks by the Central Bank Act 1942
which gave them a special relationship with the Cenbal
Bank. These banks now comprise two major lrish owned
banking groups, 40th and 62nd respectively in The Ban-
ker ranking of top European banks by market capitaliz-
ation, both formed in the mid 1960s by the amalgamation
of previously independent banks, and two subsidiaries
of foreign banks, one operating on a branch basis. These
banks have an extended branch network throughout the
country and the vast bulk of current accounts are held
with them. Market concentration in keland is high. On
the basis of Community figures for end 1987,74% of
total assets were absorbed by the largest four banks (in
practice in Ireland the major part by the big two), a figure
only approached by the Netherlands (69?o), Greece
(64?o) and Portugal 67qo). This compared with figures
ofbetween 20-27Vo for Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and the
UK, while in Germany the corresponding figure was
l54o with the remaining Member States being between
42 and 47?o (see Table 3).
The number of inhabitants per bank branch is relatively
high, exceeded only at the Community level by Greece
and Portugal (Figure l). Technological change in the
industry has been rapid with the number of automatic
teller machines per capita being well above that in a
number of Community countries. In 1987 it was more
than double that of Germany and Italy. These develop-
ments have to an extent reflected the militancy of staff
unions in the main banks which have generally not been
a party to national wage agreements.
The integration of financial markets across Community
borders will have important effects on the efficiency of
the sector itself and also on the efficiency of resource
allocation of sectors using financial markets. The ana-
lysis of the financial sector in "The Economics of 1992"
did not include statistics for Ireland. However, a report2
prepared last year suggested that the overall potential
price reduction in Ireland was halfthe average potential
reduction in the Community as a whole (see Table 4 for
an estimate of the comparable average cost of a basket
of banking services). It is doubtful if-foreign banks will
be interested in breaking into the local banking market
to take on low value consumer clients, but competition
is likely to focus on profitable niche segments. The
market share absorbed by foreign institutions in l9g7
was just I l7o.
1 E(jl is an aggegation compiled by EurosAt of data for B, DK, D, F, I, i.ll. and UK.2 Report prepared by Indecon International for the Department of 0re Taoiseach.
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EndDecemben 1969 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Total (IRlbillion)
Llensed Banks
Non-gov. current accounts
Non-gov. deposit accounts
Accrued interest
Holdings of notes +coin
Central Bank
Currency outstanding
POSB and Savlngs Banks
Deposits
State sponsored F. Instltutlons
Deposits
Bulldlng Soclettes
Sbares & deposits
Government Savlngp Schemcs
Amount outstanding
Inter-hstitution adjustment
1.01(1.33) (1.16)
% oftotd
8.8 8.9 8.1 8.5 9.4(19.30) (8.10)
53.0 50.6 46.7 46.6 46.5(45.60) (s7.20)
2.3 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.2(-) (-)
-0.7 -0.9(-) (-) -0.8 -0.8 -1.2
8.7 8.4 8.1 8.2 7.8
10.3 7.0
6.7 7.1 7.4 6.9 5.9
11.5 5.9
3.5 3.4 2.9 3.2 3.80.6 3.9
16.6 18.9 20.9 20 19.8
4.5 14.8
3.5 4.5 7.8 9.5 10.1
-L4 -L4 -2.7 -3 -3.2
Trblc l: Moncy ud othcr llquld rsscts: comPonents
Teble 2: Indlcec of benk profltebltlty (l)
Rate of Rate of Average
retumon retum on rate of
equity assets Inflation
Gefore tax) (beforc tax)
Belgium
Denmark
FR of Germany
Spain
France
Greece
heland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
UnitedKingdom
14.25
10.83
19.06
9.9s
t2.93
14.61
t2.u
19.27
9.06
17.12
5.06
22.78
0.39
1.0?
o-72
0.83
0.33
0.4
1.08
1.09
0.32
0.67
0.33
1.15
4.87
5.2
2.27
r0.6
5.83
19.6
6.27
9.53
6.1
1.6
21.57
4.7
(l) Figures in pcrccntager. Averages forthe period 1984-86.
The inflation rate har been approximated with the GDP
deflator at martct prices.
Source: OECD: Financiel Statementr of Benkr and EC Com-
mirrion.
Table 3: Merket concentretlon rnd shrre of forelgn
lnstltuitons, (r) end ol l9t?
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42
u
74
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1
4
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3
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3
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and establishments totaly or majority owned by forcign
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(2) End of 1986 for Belgium, Denmart, France, FR of Germany
and Spain. Figurcs based on unconsolidated balancc shcctr.
(3) End of 1986 for Ireland. Including the largert bantr.
Source: OECD: European central bankg and national banking
associationg
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The "loDrggocilt9(-btofc represent an assortment of
different types of banks many of them concerned with
servicing larger customers. They are generally located in
Dublin end do not operate large b,ranch networks. They
are classified into two cetegories, merchant and commer-
cial benks (numbering 22) nd industrial banks (9).
Thc other main credit and financial institutions are build-
ing societies (9), trustee savings banks (2), the Post
Office S avings Bank, state-sponsored credit institu tions
(t[re Agricultural Credit Corporation plc and Industrial
Credit Corporation plc) and hire purchase finance com-
panies (35). The building societies are principally en-
gaged in the provision of housing mortgage from
deposits taken from the public. However, under the
Building Societies Act, 1989, they are now empowered
to engage in r wide range of banking activities subject
to the approval of the Central Bank, which has been
given supervisory responsibility for the societies under
the 1989 Act. The move by building societies to extend
the range of their activities is being carried out on I
gradual basis, while the banks have correspondingly
moved into the areo of mortgage financing.
Insurance companies (67) are regulated by the Minister
for Industry and Commerce. Their total business, at 786
ECU per capita, is somewhat above the Community
averrge (686 ECU) rlthough a breakdown into life and
non-life business shows a grester concentration on the
life sector (462 ECU per head as compared with a Com-
munity aversge of 286 ECU). Premia on life insurance
policies in lrelend, representing 6A% of GDP in 1987,
were the highest recorded in the OECD area.
The Lirh-lloc,k-Er,chtlgs. which was established in
1799, is one of the oldest in the world. It is an integral
part of the International Stock Exchange in London, is
small, and the mein market is dominated by the six
largest companies that represent about two thirds of
market capitalization. More dynamic in recent years has
been the unlisted securities market with the numbers of
companies swelling by 16 in the past three years com-
pared to onc company joining the full list. The Irish gilt
market dwarfs the equity market (tumover in the account
periods ending in December 1990 being IRL4 billion in
gilts and IRL 270 million in equities). kish brokers, who
have over the years been rmalgamating to create larger
units, still operate on 8n agency basis and participants
consider that the merket is too small for marketmaking.
Only one large broking firm does not have a major
institutional shareholder and the banks generally wholly
own or have a large holding in a brokerage.
2. Recent innovations
[a lrish Futures end Options FrchenSe (IFOX) opened
on 29 May 1989. The Exchange has twenty-four mem-
bers and trades four futures contracts - a long-term gilt
contrrct, a Dublin interbrnk interest rate contract, a
dollar/hish pound contract and r contract on the Irish
Stock Exchange equity index. The Exchange is ruto-
meted rnd is supervised by the Centrat Bank on the basis
of a regulatory system designed to safeguard the finrn-
cial integrity of transactions, discourage manipulation
and provide potential users with sufficient infotuation
A new Gilts Settlements Clffice (GSO) to provide a
secure and efficient system for settling wholesale trans-
actions in gilts commenced operation on 1 February
1989. The system eliminates counterparty settlement
risk by providing for the simultaneous transfer of stock
and the corresponding guaranteed payment. The intro-
duction of the GSO, operated by the Central Bank of
heland, creates the potential for automating gilt settle-
ments as a further stage of market development. In the
year ended 3l lanuary 1990, a total of 19 700 transfers
with a nominal value of IRL 29 billion were processed.
There are thirty-five GSO members encompassing thc
Authorities, stockbrokers, nominee companies, banks,
insurance companies, building societies and the IFOX.
In December 1990 the National Treasury ManeSement
Agcncy was established to act on behalf of the Minister
for Finance in managing Ireland's National Debt. Annual
savings of IRL 40 million have been set as a target for
the agency through reducing margins and seeking out
alternative borrowing possibilities. Plans for the flrst
year include refinancing about IRL 3.5 billion of domes-
tic and IRL 500 million external debt plus up to IRL I
billion in prepayments.
Following legislation in May 1987, the Government de-
cided to establish an @iqei
Centre (IFSC) in Dublin. Occupierc of commercial space
in the new centre at the Custom House Docks covering
27 rcres will enjoy tax incentives and rates remission
under an urban renerval scheme. The EC Commi$isa
agreed in December 1990 to the extension of the end of
the concessiontry L0% corporation tsx rate for interna-
tional business in the IFSC by five years to 2005. AII
projects approved before the end of 1994 will qualify. To
date, over 180 projects have been approved with ajobr
potential of some 2 800, and two thirds of these are
already operating. The majority are in asset financing
and leasing, funds and investment management, corpor-
ate treasury management and insurance and reinsurance.
Other important areas represented are captive insurance
and securities and currency trading. The geogrophical
spread of participants is varied but with p.rticularly
strong representation of Japanese, German, British and
US financial firms.
3. Exchange controls
Exchange controls were first introduced in heland in
1939. During the war period and up to 1978 they were a
reflection of those controls which operated throughout
the Sterling Area. Restrictions applied only to trsnsac-
tions with countries outside this area and there was
complete freedom of capital movements between heland
and the United Kingdom.
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When heland decided to participate in the exchange rate
mechanism of the EMS and the United Kingdom opted
not to do so, heland was faced with the risk of exchange
rate volatility vis I vis sterling. It was considered
necessary at the time, partly because of the scarcity of
data on external holdings of Irish residents, but princi-
pally due to the expansionary budgetary policy being
pursued at that period, to take steps to counter any
possible speculative and destabilizing flow of funds. In
1978 therefore, the coverage of Ireland's exchange con-
trol system was extended to the Sterling Area. These
oontrols, administered by the Central Benk of Ireland,
restricted a wide range of payments and other financial
transactions with non-residents. Payments related to
trade, commercial and other current transactions could
however be made freely and were merely supervised to
ensure that unauthorised capital transfers did not take
place. General permissions were also given for many
capital operations (for example, inflows of capital from
abroed were encouraged and direct and real estate invest-
ments by Irish residents in the Community were per-
mitted). Certain restrictions on outward portfolio
investment, liberalised under Community directives of
the early 1960s, were however maintained. These were
allowed on the basis of a derogation under Article 108
of the Treaty of Rome.
The improvement in the public finance and external
payments position in the 1980s and the increased focus
in the Community on the creation of the internal market
led to the announcement in October 1987 of the Govem-
ment's intention to dismantle exchange controls on a
phased basis. The process began in January 1988 when
resident investors were given certain limited freedoms
to acquire foreign securities, mles governing forward
cover were relaxed and documentary requirements
eased. In January 1989 all restrictions on residents'pur-
chases of medium and long-term foreign securities were
removed and heland's Article 108 derogation lapsed. In
April 1990 greater access was provided to innovative
financial instruments, hish financial institutions were
allowed to accept fixed-term hish pound deposits from
non-residents, and administrative requirements were
further eased. Further relaxations were announced on 7
December 1990 for 1991 concentrating on beginning the
process of relaxing controls on personal foreign cur-
rency accounts, investment in short-term securities, per-
mitting long-term loans in Irish pounds to non-residents
and easing restrictions which apply only to non-EC
countries.
With the implementation of the 1991 measures compara-
tively few restrictions remain. These concern essentially
unlimited access by lrish residents to foreign short-term
securities and external bank accounts and short-term
Irish pound lending to non-residents. The Government
are committcd to completing the liberalization process
by the end of 1992 tt the latest.
Although there were substantial outflows when controls
on foreign security investment were relaxed, as institu-
tional investors restructured their portfolios, external
reseryes, representing just over 3 months import cover,
are regarded as satisfactory and keland's interest rate
differential with Germany has been reduced significant-
ly.
4. Some issues outstanding
Remaining exchang e controls
In general, there appears to be a perception in Ireland
that exchange controls have already been abolished. It
would also seem from a comparison of data from banking
returns and statistics collected for exchange control pur-
poses that a substantial number ofrestricted transfers are
not being declared. It is questionable whether the re-
maining controls serve any useful purpose and the costs
involved to operators and the authorities in maintaining
such controls may exceed any benefits accruing.
In retrospect it could be felt that comprehensive ex-
change controls may have enabled the pursuit of inap-
propriate domestic policies. The absence of such an
instrument would seem, therefore, to endogenize fiscal
responsibility.
Taxation of savings
The Deposit Interest Retention Tax (29%) is an import-
ant source of revenue for the Exchequer, accounting for
37o of total tax revenue. Full liberalization of residents'
access to foreign accounts and short-term securities
could create avenues for tax evasion. It has beenpointed
out that the UK has a similar tax, but with more excep-
tions, and that the absence of exchange controls does not
hinder collection. A number of other Member States
have already faced this problem in the liberalization
process. Although one Member State @enmark) has
adopted a tight reporting system on residents external
accounts for tax purposes, the general policy stance has
been towards some lowering of rates of taxes on the
income from savings.
The establishmenr of the IFSC in Dublin does, to a
certain extent, depend on differences in tax treatment on
interest and dividend income in the Community and
elsewhere. It has been suggested that the 10% rate of
corporation tax in the IFSC, the lack of transaction taxes,
and Ireland's double taxation treaties with many OECD
states has led to certain companies, particularly those
with Belgian, Danish and German parents, establishing
there for mainly tax reasons. However, one must also
bear in mind the rationale for establishing the Centre (i.e.
job-creation, economic development) and the fact that it
is in early stages of development. Furthermore, it has
been agreed that the cornerstone of the incentive pack-
age i.e. l07o corporation tax should end by 31 December
2005. The absence of withholding taxes on dividends
and interest payments also enhances the appeal of the
centre as a base for corporate treasury and intra-group
activity by multinationals. There may seem to be a con-
flict between the interests of the IFSC and domestic
taxation of income from savings. Thus, for example, a
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cornmon taxation regime for interest and dividend in-
come in the Community would help the authorities ob-
jectives on domestic taxation but may affect the
attractiveness of the IFSC. However, any benefits to the
Centre of differing tax regimes throughout the Com-
munity are of a temporary nature and it is intended that
the Centre should essentially be in a position to survive
and develop when such differences disappear.
Thc bank levy
A special levy on banks, introduced in the 1980s, was
renewed in the 1991 budget at its existing level of IRL
36 million. The levyrepresents a tax equivalent of about
70 pence per annum on every IRL 100 of domestic bank
savings. Foreign banks with no IRL deposits are not
subject to the levy nor is it charged on non-bank savings
deposits. In the context of the opening up of the banking
market in the Community this levy will constitute a
competitive disadvantage for domestic banks. The Min-
ister for Finance has announced his intention to set up a
special working group of officials and representatives of
the banks to eramine corporation tax applying to banks
and the role of the levy and will look at the matter again
when formulating his 1992 budget.
The Business Expansion Scheme
The Business Expansion scheme, introduced in 1984,
was aimed at helping smaller companies in need of seed
capital. Under the scheme tax payers purchasing the
non-quoted shares of qualifying Irish manufacturing
companies, or of companies engaged in certain interna-
tional services, may deduct the amount of the purchase
to a maximum of IRL 25 000 a year from taxable income.
The scheme was extended to tourism, shipping and trad-
ing houses in 1987, plant cultivation in 1988 and con-
struction and leasing of advance factories in 1990.
The Commission noted in November 1987 that there had
been an increasing tendency in Member States to intro-
duce tax incentives for the purchase of domestic se-
curities which in its view were discriminatory and
should be eliminated, and the Business Expansion
Scheme has been classed as such an incentive.
The scheme is estimated to have cost the Exchequer IRL
40 million in tax foregone in the 1989/90 tax year and
the Minister of Finance admitted that it is frequently
being used to provide relief for investment in secure
asset-backed ventures involving little risk and "creating
an unacceptable tax shelter". The scheme was severely
restricted in 1991, with the funds so released being used
to help pay for income tax reductions. Although such
schemes are, as already stated, a feature of many Mem-
ber States'tax systems, its distortionary nature may still
create compatibility problems with Comrnunity rules. In
Ireland's case, the scheme must be seen in the context of
the limited availability of venture capital domestically
and the need to help Irish industry to overcome disad-
vantages relative to other Member States.
. This chapter was mainly prepared by K. I*nnan of the Directorate for Financial engineering and capital movements.
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